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THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1937

JOHN W. DAFOE

THE Imperial Conference of 1937 was the least spectacular of the whole series from 1887 down to the present day. Its tepid, non-committal report commanded only a lukewarm press. "Less impressive than its predecessors," "conclusions small and of limited moment," "ending in a cloud of admirable sentiments," "singularly reticent," "vague,"—these characterizations of the findings are picked almost at random from the press of four British nations. But a Canadian minister, in attendance at the Conference, gave a different summing-up. He said the Conference was "useful" and contented himself with this single word. Doubtless this was a true word. A Conference including six British prime ministers, each with his retinue of colleagues, advisers, secretaries, and experts, continuing for a month, with special facilities for the interchange of information and views, could not but be of great value to all those in attendance. Indirectly there doubtless will be worthwhile results as the outcome of these exchanges of views, this widening of knowledge, this pooling of experience; but of actual business little was done because there was nothing much that could be done under the conditions that prevailed.

The Imperial Conference, which once made history, has thus seemingly tapered off to a gathering for the interchange of views, with conclusions and findings so general in character, expressed in terms of such vagueness, that it is the inclination of a public that was prepared to be interested, to dismiss it as something of little consequence. But to reach this conclusion might be a

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mistake because there are occasions when inaction is more significant than action, as seems to be the case in this instance. The Conference was unheroic because the British Conference system has passed into a new phase which restricted freedom of action. There have been three such phases, and the 1937 Conference marked the beginning of the fourth. First, there were the Colonial Conferences from 1887 to 1907; then the Imperial Conferences that shaded off into Commonwealth Conferences, gatherings of equals. At every one of the twelve preceding gatherings (including two sub-conferences) there were definite findings of one kind or another, the result of discussion and the adjustment of differing views. All the Colonial and Imperial Conferences were called avowedly in the interests of Empire consolidation by agreement for common action. In the first of the series Lord Salisbury said plainly that the business before the gathering was the forwarding of Imperial naval defence. The colonies, he said, must put away luxurious aspirations in the constitutional sense and concentrate on the severely practical matter of combining with the mother-country for purposes of self-defence. That in the succession of these Conferences the pressure for further consolidation of the Empire with a common policy of defence failed, was due mainly to the delaying and blocking technique developed by Canada. But always, when a Conference was called, the hopes of the "Round-Tablers" rose and they laid their plans; and this was never more the case than on the eve of the momentous war-time Conference of 1917. To those hopes Lord Milner gave confident expression on the eve of the Conference. Instead, the Conference, at the joint instance of Sir Robert Borden and General Smuts, made the great declaration which resulted within thirteen years in the Commonwealth

replacing the Empire. A determined effort to reverse this tendency was made in the 1921 Conference, which for the moment seemed to succeed; but with the Conference of 1923 the movement of transformation from Empire to Commonwealth resumed its irresistible march, and in 1930 reached its goal when the Conference of that year agreed to the principles embodied in the Westminster Act. The Commonwealth, which had in fact been in existence since 1917 by virtue of constitutional conventions, was confirmed by formal legal enactment. This closed an era and brought to an end the series of Conferences to which the ever-present fundamental issue of centralization or diversity gave character.

The 1937 Conference was the first to be held by the "sovereign nations" which form the British Commonwealth. The quoted words are from the speech made by Mr. J. A. Lyons, prime minister of Australia, in his opening statement at the Conference. Between the Imperial Conference of 1930 and that of 1937 (the Ottawa meeting of 1932 was a sub-conference to deal with a particular matter) the world had changed incalculably for the worse; and there was anxious and widespread interest in the reaction to these conditions that would be shown by the sovereign British nations meeting in conference to consider their particular interests and their relationships with one another. That under these conditions they did precisely nothing is more significant and revealing than positive action would have been; and for good or evil will make this do-nothing Conference a landmark in the history of British relationships. When the British Empire finally divided itself in 1930 into "sovereign nations" it did so in a world at peace and, in theory at least, subject to law that would ensure the continuance of peace. There was a close relationship between the

apparent acceptance by the world of the idea of security by collective action and the progressive transformation of the Empire into the Commonwealth. When in the early days of the League the *Morning Post*, speaking from a deep bitterness of spirit, said that if "Geneva" was not destroyed it would destroy the British Empire, it was speaking by the book, having regard to what it meant by the term "British Empire." The highly centralized Empire, with a common organ of government, could probably not have been achieved in any event, but its advocates would not have been so rapidly and completely worsted if it had been made clear in November, 1918, that the War had not come to an end but had only been suspended owing to the exhaustion of the participants. The illusion of a world at peace robbed them of their arguments, for in such a world the proposition of an armed federation of the British nations, which could only be attained by the suppression in the lesser nations of their instinct completely to govern themselves and to develop their own national character, simply did not make sense. What the statesmen of these nations, with incredible blindness, would not see was that the conception of the Commonwealth, as a brotherhood of kindred nations co-operating in peaceful measures for their mutual advantage, was only possible in a world obedient to the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League and in the Pact of Paris; and that it was incumbent upon them, not as an organized *bloc* but in co-operation with one another and with other nations of like intent, to make it certain that the League was duly established. Given the vision and the will, these powers had the strength to do this thing; and the consequences of their blindness of vision and their absence of will, are a tale that will be told in the years to come.

In 1930, there was no clear sign of impending disaster, though the violence of the economic war that was proceeding with ever-deepening intensity between the nations should have been a warning that the League spirit was evaporating. At that time a pitiful confidence was reposed in Article XI of the Covenant which provided for conciliation. Articles abounded in the periodical press, and even volumes appeared, in which the theory was advanced that this Article had so proved its worth that the problem of security was solved. One supposed authority held that it was inconceivable that any nation would ever venture to refuse to submit itself to the conciliation procedures provided for by this Article. But within a year of the definite emergence of the Commonwealth, the impotency of the League as the protector of one of its members against deliberate aggression by another member, was revealed. It can now be clearly seen that the policy of relying in the Manchurian case solely upon "conciliation"—which was declared by Sir John Simon, then the foreign minister of Great Britain, to be the only course which the British government would consider—was a mortal wound to the nations' faith in collective security: on the morrow all over the world the nations sensed the return of power-politics, and began to re-orient their policies, from motives of fear, of precaution, of ambition, to meet the future they foresaw. The resulting harvest the world has already in small part reaped; and the rest, in farming phrase, is rapidly "coming in."

How would the British Commonwealth of Nations adjust itself to this new post-League world, a grotesque revival of the pre-war world? That has been a question in the minds of citizens of these nations, and partial answers have been given by the course of events, with the late Conference making much the clearest contribu-

tion. There were early signs that the British nations, having just drawn apart, would use their freedom to find anew grounds for common action in the face of trade depression, economic war, and the prospect of impending international anarchy. The adoption by Great Britain of tariff protection was not unconnected with an expectation that it would make possible a system of imperial preferential trade that would be an approximation to Chamberlain's dream and would have the effect that he hoped for: the political consolidation of the British nations. The Ottawa arrangements were an instalment of this project. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, now prime minister of Great Britain, in addresses following the Ottawa Conference to both Canadian and British audiences, said that one of the purposes of the agreements was to strengthen political bonds which were growing slender. Certainly the remnants of the old Chamberlainite organization hailed the development as foreshadowing the fulfilment of the programme that had been so roughly treated by the British electorate in the early days of the century. In the intervening five years the continuing disintegration of the League and the progressive repudiation of obligations towards it by the two chief British nations—Great Britain and Canada—have strengthened the hopes of those who desire a closely-bound "British League" to replace the now impotent and discredited Geneva organization.

As it was evident that the Imperial Conference could not meet without throwing light upon all these matters, the proceedings at London were awaited with a lively interest. The significance of the meeting did not depend upon its official placing. Indeed, the governments rather conspired to minimize the importance of the gathering. The agenda issued in advance was colourless. The

communiqués issued daily while the Conference was in session were of almost incredible effectiveness in their restriction of information. The report was a mere conglomeration of words of unprecise meaning. Nevertheless, if the actual discussions are not open to us, the general course of the deliberations is known; and there is enlightenment in the few things that were decided and in the issues that were evaded, at least so far as reaching decisions upon them was concerned. No doubt it was around these undecided questions that the discussions mostly centred.

"Foreign Affairs and defence" appeared on the agenda as a subject "affording an opportunity for the discussion of a matter of common interest." Involved inevitably in the consideration of these questions would be the position of the League now and in its future as an influence in world affairs and as a factor in defence. There were three lines along which arguments might proceed and there is evidence that all these views were presented.

First: Support the League as an agency against aggression; and give practical effect to this support by some group-understanding about a policy of co-ordinated defence for the Commonwealth to include, of course, provision of local defence. This was apparently the position of Australia, with New Zealand going beyond it in outspoken support of sanctionist League policies. Mr. Lyons, in his opening statement, demanded "the formulation of a consistent and unified Empire policy," to be reached after considering the position of the League. The countries of the Commonwealth should, he said, be "prepared to act together in support of the maintenance of international law and order." In the formal speeches made by Mr. Savage, prime minister of New Zealand, reported in the blue book, he makes no direct reference

to the League, but it is known that he advocated complete acceptance of League obligations. Speaking in Wellington upon his return, Mr. Savage said that his own conception of the right policy was one of effective support of the League Covenant, the removal of economic causes of conflict, and a common Empire defence policy.

The second policy suggested was one which entirely ignored the League as a factor in keeping the peace, and urged a policy of co-ordination and co-operation between the members of the Commonwealth, with an allocation of responsibilities which added up to a common defence policy with effective control in London. This was the official view of the government of Great Britain. The ignoring of the League did not go to the point of impoliteness. So far as words go, nothing could exceed the professed devotion of Great Britain to the League; but these words have no practical implications.

Then there was a view which also ignored the League and as well rejected outright all propositions looking towards a common defence policy and all understandings that might carry with them implications of commitments. This was the Canadian position.

The South African position might also be noted since it comes within none of these classifications. It was more sympathetic to the League than the Canadian position, but was identical with it in the rejection of a common policy of defence.

If we are to go by the report issued by the Conference itself, it can be said without hesitation that it was the Canadian view that prevailed. There is nothing about a common defence policy in the report, but much stress is laid upon responsibility for local defence, and practical recognition of this duty, with some reference to a common system of organization and training which would enable

any Dominion, "if it so desired," to co-operate with other countries of the Commonwealth without delay. With nothing about common defence and thumbs down for the League all through the piece, it is a reasonable deduction that Canada's refusal to accept commitments, actual or implied, was the limiting and determining factor in fixing the policy of no-policy.

But it is to be noted that very good authorities think otherwise. It has been already observed that one of the reasons for hostility to the League in Great Britain was the belief by good Imperialists that it displaced the Empire in the affections of too many people. Obviously it would be clever tactics, if this were possible, to destroy all confidence in the League, leaving a united Empire as the only possible defence for the Dominions. The Marquis of Lothian, in a review of the work of the Conference, declares that this is just what happened. Combining the official report "with the inside information that always circulates outside," Lord Lothian thinks that the Conference practically adopted the views of the "New League or No League" group, of which he is the most distinguished member and of which Mr. Garvin of the *Observer* is the recognized organist. Therefore in his opinion, the Conference "quietly buried the impracticable aspects of the League," that is, the provision for common defence for an attacked member; fell in with the thesis that "the immediate problem is to try to find a friendly solution of the 'German problem';" and found itself in opposition to the League's continuing if it meant a "divided world." Having thus rejected the League as the foundation of its foreign policy, "the British Commonwealth of Nations itself has now," in his opinion, "become the chief concern of the Dominions," and by reason of the

adoption of this attitude the late Conference became "the most important of the series of imperial conferences."

Lord Lothian is probably well informed as to the origin of the paragraphs in the report relating to the League. They embody almost direct transcripts from the stock arguments long persistently advanced by his group, and particularly the disingenuous contention that the League, if it cannot be universal, ought to fold up, since otherwise it would proclaim a "division, real or apparent" of the world into opposing groups. What is to be thought of the perspicacity of a group of statesmen who can see no difference between an alliance of free democratic nations directed towards a single purpose, their common defence against assault by gangster nations, and an alliance of gangster nations bent upon policies of aggression and theft? These statesmen appear to think further that there is no harm in this division, provided attention is not drawn to it. (Of course, when the writer of this article says "the League of Nations" he means the real League and not the denatured substitute about which the Imperial Conference was prepared to say soft words.)

But in the case of the "common policy of defence" which Lord Lothian thinks was agreed upon, thus making the late Conference the most notable of the series, he has let his hopes run away with his judgment. This statement is made advisedly upon authority of the kind accepted by Lord Lothian: the text of the report plus inside information which circulated outside. The report is in the vaguest terms; and it is in these terms because repeated, persistent, and ingenious attempts were made unavailingly to secure the adoption of resolutions which would have justified the inclusion in the report of statements that would have given support to Lord Lothian's

contention. General as the report is, it carries an explanatory footnote which states that nothing in the report limits the statements made by the various governments at the League Assembly in September, 1936. It was in his statement to the Assembly that Mr. King denied commitments either to the League or to the Commonwealth. Mr. King has said publicly in London and in Canada that he agreed to nothing at the Conference which in any way modifies the position he took at Geneva last September and reaffirmed in February last; and this is confirmed, not by what the report says but by what it does not say.

The significance of this attitude and its bearing upon the findings of the Conference is very great and it ought not to be lost upon the Commonwealth statesmen and interested outsiders like Lord Lothian. It is not unreasonable to infer from the published reports and from other known facts that Great Britain could have worked out at the Conference separate policies of defence with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; probably with India; perhaps afterwards with the Irish Free State, which absented itself from the Conference. Why? Not because they had any higher sense of duty to their own people than the representatives of Canada had; but because Great Britain's co-operation and help are more necessary to them in defence than the government of Canada thinks they are to this country. They may thus be willing to make arrangements involving perhaps serious commitments that under other circumstances they would not think of making.

The opportunity was lost because the tradition of unity prevailed and with it the sense of the need of a policy, or lack of policy, to which all could subscribe. When this idea prevails, the common denominator for a

variation in policies must be that set by the reluctance of the least co-operative member—which in this case was Canada. And the weakness of the "all for one and one for all" doctrine, thus revealed, will operate increasingly because in the world in which the nations now find themselves, it tends to become obsolete. In the lost world of the League, the relationship between the British Dominions and their common relationship towards Great Britain might have gone on undisturbed for a very long time; but in the world of to-day, and still more of to-morrow, every nation in the Commonwealth will have to fend for itself on the basis of grim reality, making the best arrangements it can for its protection at the least cost, with a minimum regard—if not total disregard—for sentimental considerations. Canada's non-co-operative attitude at London, which will be judged as short-sighted and selfish by those who still think in the modes of yesterday, is part and lot of the new hard-boiled conception of national policy, which repudiates all obligations and commitments unless it is convenient, suitable, and safe to recognize them. Canada, in taking this position, is part of a large and distinguished company.

The inference from these developments is that the Dominion relationships, due to the changed international scene, will now, or at some time not far in the future, undergo a change, which has already been foreseen by some students of Commonwealth matters. The Commonwealth will transform itself into a Personal Union with the common king as the sole tie, which will permit a flexibility of arrangements and adjustments between all the British nations, or between individual nations, that will be increasingly necessary in the difficult years that lie ahead. This foreshadowing of change is the real significance of the late Conference.

So much for the Conference proper; but it would not do not to take note in this review of a major issue which came before the Conference for discussion, though it was not on the agenda, nor is there any specific reference to it in the report of the proceedings. This was the proposed trade agreement between Great Britain and the United States. Originally there was no intention of having anything beyond some very general discussion about intra-imperial trade. Nevertheless, the urgency of the world situation forced the general consideration of trade matters. A fantastic theory of how this question came before the Conference has been given currency in some sections of the Canadian press. This represents Mr. King as the agent of President Roosevelt in urging the matter upon the Conference; the British government as reluctant and resistant in its attitude; and the absence of any reference to the question in the findings of the Commission as proof conclusive that the wise British escaped the snare, to the discomfiture of President Roosevelt and Mr. King. If the Conference had been an executive body intent upon reaching decisions and adopting specific policies, the question of a trade arrangement between the United States and Great Britain might have been ruled out as not germane; but since it was a "talk fest" covering the whole range of questions affecting the interests of the Commonwealth, it was inescapable that the matter of a trade arrangement with the United States should be brought in—and not at the instance of Mr. King.

The United States government, not only by public statements by Mr. Cordell Hull but by diplomatic representations by Mr. Norman Davis, American ambassador at large, had made known to the British government its inclination to enlarge its service of trade agreements by

the inclusion of Great Britain; and the beneficial consequences of such an arrangement, not only with respect to trade but beyond this in the field of international relationships, could not but be present in the minds of every member of the Conference. Moreover, Mr. Runciman had visited Washington and had there been given a draft of the arrangement proposed by the United States, which involved certain modifications in the trade agreements between the British government and the Dominions. Though the negotiations of the treaty could not in any case be attempted for some months, there could be no doubt of the advisability of eliciting round-table opinions upon the project. The haziness of the Conference report reaches its maximum in its eleventh section, which deals with "the progress of Empire Trade and Allied Questions;" but it is not necessary that we should limit our knowledge of what actually took place to the vague and evasive phrasing of this document. Even here, however, the statement is found that "the outstanding feature of the discussion was the emphatic desire expressed by the representative of every part of the British Commonwealth represented at the Conference that all practicable steps should be taken to secure the stimulation of international trade."

There is obscurity about the course of the discussion and the reaction of the parties to the Conference to the proposition. All parties accepted it "in principle"—a term which is now justly regarded as derisive; it means that there were Dominion statesmen who thought a trade agreement between the United States and Great Britain would be a great thing for the world but not to be tolerated if it deprived their country of any advantage it now possesses in the British market with respect to any class of exports. The easement of world stresses in trade and

the psychological effect upon world opinion of a friendly readjustment of their trade relations by the two great English-speaking nations, with the certain contribution towards stabilization which this would make—these were desirable objectives to be sure, but not really to be put in the balance against maximum sales of Dominion-grown raisins, apples, timber, and so forth, in the British market.

Apparently these questionings were individual on the part of the Dominion representatives—no formal position being taken by any delegation, with the possible exception of Australia (where a general election is pending). If reports are to be accepted, Mr. King and a majority of the Canadian representatives were wholeheartedly in favour of the project even though it might involve some seeming sacrifice. It may be doubted whether the discussions on balance helped forward the enterprise of a British-American trade understanding. This is a striking illustration of the danger of artificially creating an economic advantage and endowing it with the defensive power of a "vested right." If in the negotiations some modifications in the preferential advantages now enjoyed by Canada, Australia, and other Dominions are sought, as will inevitably happen, the British government—it was apparently decided—is to consult the Dominions, which is but right; but how far this goes towards giving the Dominions a veto power does not yet appear.

The surprising and encouraging aspect of this development was the reported friendliness of the British government to the idea of coming to a trade agreement with the United States; and the prompt manifestation of popular support for such a policy. The attitude of the British government was, of course, not proclaimed, but the belief in its friendliness and even eagerness to enter into such an agreement was so general in all those circles

that had contacts with the Conference that there is no ground for doubt in the matter.

If confirmation were needed, it would be found in the frenzy of apprehension into which Mr. Amery and his friends have been thrown by this—to them—astonishing and unexpected development. They have cherished since the days of Joseph Chamberlain, in the face of many bitter disappointments, their belief in the coming of a unified Empire, set aside from the outer world as an economic and political unit; and in recent years they have been finding new hope in the policies of imperial preference as adopted at Ottawa in 1932. By laying the foundations of a trading unity, they hoped conditions would be created which would in time lead to a revival of the political idea of a centralized Empire. The protests of Mr. Amery, Sir Henry Page Croft, the *National Review*, and others have been revealing as to the reality of this menace to their hopes, and their resulting consternation. "Empire trade," Mr. Amery points out in a letter to *The Times*, "is something more than foreign trade. It is a means to a greater end, to the building of those resources, material and human, in the Empire and that sense of common interest, upon which the defence of our common heritage of ordered freedom must ultimately rest." With a Chamberlain as prime minister "we might well have expected," said Mr. Amery further, "a general demand for a more forward policy. Instead of that the moment seems to be chosen, not only by all the diehards of nineteenth-century economics, but in many quarters where the ideal of Imperial unity is warmly professed, for a dead set against the whole policy of Ottawa." Behind those words it is easy to see astonishment, resentment, and fear.

Behind this political opposition, the strength of which

is problematical but might easily be under-rated, is the massed power of the "vested interests" which have grown up under "Ottawa." As a London correspondent has recently pointed out, these combined forces are waging a vigorous and not too scrupulous campaign against the idea of any trade agreement. The *National Review* is seeking to invoke whatever anti-Americanism is latent in Great Britain against the proposition. The silence of the government in the face of this opposition is not necessarily a discouraging sign; in any case, as has been officially stated, negotiations in earnest cannot begin until October. Meanwhile, the manifestations of popular support—from the large liberal elements in the ministerial party, from the Liberal and Labour parties, from powerful commercial and financial interests, from leading Conservative newspapers (including both *The Times* and the *Telegraph*)—continue. This is in confirmation of a statement often made and ardently denied, that despite the policies of 1931 and 1932, resorted to under what seemed the demands of necessity, Great Britain is not, in actual belief, a protectionist country. The position of the prime minister in this conflict is of unique interest. By all the rules of probability he should be with Mr. Amery; but not the least interesting inference from Mr. Amery's apparent anguish is that Mr. Chamberlain, on this great issue, is a backslider.

If, as a by-product of the Conference, there should be an adjustment of trade relations between Great Britain and the United States in a form which would suggest to the world that there is a disposition on the part of these two nations to look at things from the same angle, there might be results in the form of world stabilization which would lift the Imperial Conference of 1937 to a height which would earn it the gratitude of the nations and give it its place in the roll-call of great events.

EUGENE O'NEILL: THE FACE AND THE MASK

LEON EDEL

WHEN Mr. Eugene O'Neill last November received the Nobel prize for literature, he modestly remarked that it was "a symbol of the coming of age of the American theatre," thus dividing the honours with his contemporaries, many of whom no longer considered him artistically contemporaneous. For there has been in recent dramatic literature no more interesting example of an early flowering and—though the point is disputable—a premature fading: the explosion of a dynamic force that spent itself within its decade. There is ample justification for seeing in the awarding of the Nobel prize a belated crowning of Eugene O'Neill's early promise rather than of his later and grosser success. The prize consecrates his historic position in the American theatre, but is capable of exaggerating his importance to the drama of the 1930's. In a word, if in O'Neill the American theatre came of age, it is going on to maturity in other hands.

This means that Mr. O'Neill has failed to go on, though perhaps only for the moment. He is still this side of fifty, and holds the promise of many plays to come. Bernard Shaw, at fifty, stood at the threshold of his dramatic career, and he had passed his seventieth birthday before he became a laureate of the Swedish Academy. The history of literature and the theatre is full of "later manners" and "final periods." Who knows but that O'Neill, despite the apparent finality of the body of his work, may have in reserve some later, some third period?

For such a period, if we are to take academic measure-

ment of his work, would be his third. His first, roughly speaking, embodies the plays of outer, vivid action; his second, those of inner struggle; the first drawn from ready experience, fruit of a youth energetically lived, the second clearly testifying to subsequent introspection attendant upon success, leisure, and ease. These "periods" are by no means a water-tight classification. Among the early plays are works foreshadowing the later experiments, even as among the later plays there is an occasional return to the earlier material. *The Great God Brown*, produced by the Theatre Guild in 1925, can be taken as a rough boundary post planted on the roadway that leads from the O'Neill of the sea plays to the O'Neill of *Strange Interlude* and *Mourning Becomes Electra*. And like the characters of *The Great God Brown* who changed their masks when they changed personalities, O'Neill, the adventurer, has put on the mask of O'Neill, the successful Broadway playwright, reversing the situation in his own play, for Dion has thus put on the mask of Brown.

More than ten years have elapsed, and he has not removed it.

The Face

The story of O'Neill's early life is well known. He has recounted it himself, nor need one go to the various books that have been written about him to discover it. It leaps at you from the early plays, fruit of the years in which O'Neill tramped and sailed and drank, met men and women as fellow-workers, faced constantly the struggle for existence, and knew unemployment and its boon companions, sleeplessness and starvation.

The son of an actor, O'Neill had the theatre in his blood, and the lust of a wanderer, for his father had

wandered up and down and across the United States playing a stage version of *The Count of Monte Cristo.* One can almost visualize Eugene, young and earnest, his chin firmly set, watching his father plunge his hands into the treasure and shout, "The world is mine!" and deciding then and there to seek out that world and its treasure. He found instead the loneliness of sky and sea, the foul smells and wretched food aboard cattle-boats, the griminess and sweat of the stoke-hole, the ever-present threat of starvation during weeks ashore and the squalor and despair of the waterfronts. In the mind of a boy not yet twenty, these experiences must have been extremely vivid: but they do not seem to have imprinted themselves indelibly on his mind. One experience was effaced by another: he remained, apparently, a spectator rather than a participant, too immature for profound reflection and too volatile for serious participation.

After some years of this varied hard living there came a breakdown and a sojourn in a sanatorium, during which, O'Neill tells us, he decided to write. He had ready experience to draw upon, and the dramatic form had ever been before him. And yet the period of apprenticeship was long. He fumbled at first, writing plays and destroying them. He read avidly, seeking to grasp the dramatic forms of his predecessors, Ibsen and Strindberg, and he taught himself German over the pages of Nietzsche. He studied at the Harvard Workshop under George Pierce Baker. O'Neill was no inspired dramatist whose flowing pen might straightway turn experience into drama. He approached his chosen field fully conscious of his intentions, and, with a world to write about, hesitated before giving it form.

I think there are other important reasons for O'Neill's long apprenticeship, aside from the fact that the drama

itself, a cruel and exigent form, demands long preparation. First of all, O'Neill is not a born dramatist, still less a facile writer. He is essentially a man of the theatre, not of the library, and any examination of his plays, however cursory, reveals effort and strain in the writing. The stage directions abound in *clichés* and in careless use of words, and the speeches are often stock-in-trade dramatics. Another reason is that experiences for him seem to be isolated and lacking in depth, so that he is uncertain of his ideas, and reaches for them insecurely. An impressionable man, he did not synthetize all that happened to him into a profounder understanding of his fellow-men, into one vast fund of experience which could stand him in good stead through all the artifices of creation. Instead, he became a reporter-dramatist, as inconstant, unsearching, unquestioning as the day-to-day journalist. How else explain the fact that O'Neill exhausted his various adventures by writing a play about each, and then had no more to say about them? For you can match the plays of his first period unfailingly with his life, and see how he jumped from play to play as he did from adventure to adventure. He had known wanderlust, and tells of it in *Beyond the Horizon*. His sea experiences he recounts in the one-act sea plays. He prospects for gold, and writes a play called *Gold*. *The Hairy Ape* treats of the stoke-hole; *Anna Christie*, of the waterfront; *The First Man*, probably some acutely felt domestic experience; *The Straw*, life in a sanatorium. . . . O'Neill reported on his experiences faithfully and vividly, but with all the superficiality of the reporter.

In all these plays he eschews the drama of ideas; he prefers cold objectivity to passionate appeal. As a result his pictures have scenic interest, and dramatic conse-

quence, but lack the alert and lively qualities which animate the social drama of the present day. Let it be remembered that the drama of O'Neill's first period is social drama, and O'Neill himself a vague representative of that equally vague wave of socialistic liberal sentiment that swept the United States in the years following the War. Here are the sailors, says O'Neill; what a tough life they lead; it's just one drunk after another in port, and you're lucky if the dame doesn't get the roll and you're not shanghaied on some long voyage round the Horn.

> . . . This sailor life ain't much to cry about leavin'—just one ship after another, hard work, small pay, and bum grub; and when we get into port, just a drunk endin' up in a fight, and all your money gone, and then ship away again. Never meetin' no nice people; never gettin' outa sailor-town, hardly, in any port; travelin' all over the world and never seein' none of it; without no one to care whether you're alive or dead. (*With a bitter smile*) There ain't much in all that that'd make yuh sorry to lose it.

Thus Yank, the dying seaman in *Bound East for Cardiff*, conveying Mr. O'Neill's picture of hopeless futile lives spent at odds with the sea and the world of ships; brawling and drunkenness, as in *The Moon of the Caribbees;* frustrated love and homesickness, as in *In the Zone;* pathetic struggle to leave the sea, as in the case of the shanghaied Swede in *The Long Voyage Home.*

The same hopelessness and futility in *Beyond the Horizon*, which shows the wanderlust O'Neill had experienced, tied down and unable to escape the confines of a New England farm; in *The Hairy Ape*, the perplexed and confused mind of a stoker caught in forces that are beyond his control; in *Desire Under the Elms*, with its unpleasant story of New England farm-life, the transference of Tolstoy's *Power of Darkness* to an American environment.

Of all these plays, the *Emperor Jones* and *The Hairy Ape* illustrate the best and the worst in the young dramatist. *Emperor Jones*, a bold experiment, with its striking use of sound on the stage in the form of the beating tom-toms, its monologue structure and rapid scenic description of a state of mind, has become almost a classic in its own time. O'Neill made it almost entirely a dramatic picture of fear, primitive and unconfined. His use of the material, particularly his dramatization of the Emperor's stream of consciousness, showed him to be an unhesitating experimentalist, who could rely, when all else failed him, on his sense of the theatre. For *Emperor Jones* is essentially theatric; and it is O'Neill's "theatre" that is interesting rather than his drama.

The Hairy Ape could have been more successful still, for where O'Neill had dramatized a state of mind in *Emperor Jones*, he attempted in his picture of the ape-like stoker to dramatize a consciousness struggling to penetrate a world beyond its reach. This is a much vaster, infinitely richer, and more complex theme. The central idea was to show a worker, blind to all else but his own strength and his belief that it is he who provides the creative force and energy that "makes the world go round;" and by successive stages to portray his disillusionment and collapse when he discovers that he is merely the helpless instrument of other forces, and that it is their will that moves the world, for they control it. O'Neill made of this a gloomy picture of a child-man beating against a wall he cannot scale. As a pathetic study of an individual case, a weak man, weak in all but his physical strength, the play has many touching moments, but the drama is weakened by the very weakness of the central figure. A dramatist more aware than O'Neill of social conflict, would have selected an intelligence capable of perceiving the issues, at first dimly, and

later more clearly, and would have thus built a stronger and truer play. Mr. O'Neill merely asks us to contemplate a pathetic case, and the pity aroused in us for this poor man can be no greater than for some powerful caged beast, roaring to be freed, but imprisoned for always. The stoker's monologue becomes monotonous and repetitive after its first fiery outbursts. What might have been a strong picture of valiant struggle and defeat—and therefore an inspiring picture—ends in the sad embrace in the zoo in which the ape-hero is symbolically crushed to death in the arms of his ape-ancestor. "Why not have the man kill the ghost, instead of the ghost the man?" was Shaw's advice to Henry James. One would like to apply it to this play in which O'Neill dismisses the most important question of this century with an indecisive shake of the head.

I will not dwell on the more "literary" efforts which also fall in the first period, such as *Marco Millions*, or *The Fountain*. Their hackneyed phrases sound strange to-day. The last stage direction in *The Fountain*, in which O'Neill talks of two strains of music blending and filling the air "in an all-comprehending hymn of the mystery of life," is characteristic. He was to write many speeches in an apparent search for the "mystery of life," remaining ever intensely mystified and disconcerted by it. Or he was to offer us, in *The Great God Brown*, such a specimen of "grim irony" as the curtain of act four, scene two, when the police captain asks for details concerning the strange death of Dion-Brown:

CAPTAIN (*comes just into sight at left and speaks without looking at them, gruffly*): Well, what's his name?

CYBEL: Man.

CAPTAIN (*taking a grimy notebook and an inch-long pencil from his pocket*): How d'yuh spell it?

For all its weaknesses, the first period of O'Neill's dramatic writing is a prolific, fruitful period. He brought truthful statement and robust dialogue into the American theatre and reflected faithfully a series of personal adventures that had been vividly if superficially experienced. Perhaps it was his background in the theatre that prevented him from participating more fully in that life of adventure in which he seems to have lived as a resolute observer. He went to sea, it must be remembered, after a brief taste of college life at Princeton. The immature freshman, adolescently emotional and sensitive, may have been, like his character Smitty, a perpetual outsider among the seamen. He may very well have seen his fellow-sailors, from the outset, as so many characters in a play. And this is important, for it explains to a degree the reportorial character of these plays.

O'Neill nevertheless opened new horizons for the American theatre during these years, assimilating ideas from the contemporary European theatre and adapting them easily to his needs. He borrowed freely from Strindberg; he flirted with the so-called "expressionistic" drama of the Germans; in fact, no experiment, no dramatic invention, seemed too bold or dangerous. He did not lack courage, or sincerity, and his sea plays, with *Beyond the Horizon*, *Emperor Jones*, *Anna Christie*, and *Desire Under the Elms*, seem destined to hold the stage. Written with earnest conviction, one might almost say youthful fervour, original and inventive in their scenic content, these plays forecast the strong social drama of the 1930's. This is the great anomaly in O'Neill. Containing within him all the germs of a fine social dramatist, he did not allow them to take root and flourish. He showed the younger play-writing generation the way to a

more living theatre of flesh-and-blood creatures talking their own sturdy language; he gave them a precedent for the unprecedented on the stage, for hardy experiment and the free play of all possible stage techniques. He showed the way to the socially-conscious theatre, and then retired himself to the drawing-room. In the 1920's he was, we might say, writing for the 1930's. In the 1930's he is most definitely a dramatist of the empty 1920's.

The Mask

I know that it is dangerous thus to check off decades, as if art is to be parcelled with the years like the newspapers. But if ever there was a period in English and American literature that marked itself with the stamp of the years—as much as the over-emphasized nineties—it was the 1920's. From the uncertainty of the War the young men and young women of that time found themselves suddenly moving into a broad era of noisy reconstruction and world boom, and, in the United States, of wild spendthrift prosperity. Early in the 1920's James Joyce had published *Ulysses*, and immediately a generation of Joyces sprang up, those who were influenced and those who imitated. In most he inspired a feeling of inferiority. They had all been such promising young men and young women and here had come this universe-embracing Irishman, with his vast Dublin panorama and his fatal brilliance. They thought themselves puny weaklings—and of course most of them were. T. S. Eliot wrote at the time: "I hold this book to be the most important expression which this age has found: it is a book to which we are all indebted, and from which none of us can escape . . . it has given me all the surprise, delight and terror that I can imagine . . . ."

Such a blurby-sounding pronouncement from the meticulous author of a series of polished and important essays was typical and significant. Is it any wonder that the Left-Bankers struck attitudes, that *transition* came into being, that adolescent youths quoted from *Anna Livia Plurabelle*, and that the poem which had most influence during the period was called *The Waste Land?* Older writers who had shown promise even before the twenties underwent curious metamorphoses. Virginia Woolf changed her style overnight. Ezra Pound wrote exhortatory poetry, poems which invariably began "Let us . . . " do this and "Let us . . . " do that. But nothing was done. E. E. Cummings experimented with typographical effects, allowing his poems to be influenced by his unwillingness at times to use—either purposely or accidentally—the shift-key on his typewriter. Aldous Huxley admitted defeat, and portrayed it. John Middleton Murry published all the fragments left by Katherine Mansfield, although she had written in her journal that it would be terrible to die leaving odds and ends behind. H. L. Mencken, with a series of "phony" gestures and an assortment of foreign words that seemed to belie the adequacy of the American language, became the idol of the undergraduate. Those were the great days of the *American Mercury:* born and nurtured in the 1920's, it collapsed sadly in the alien thirties. D. H. Lawrence, he an early Georgian, burning in these later years with the fever of tuberculosis, wrote *Lady Chatterley's Lover.* The middle-aged "creative" generation now felt that all was futile; the younger accepted futility without even feeling it, and drowned its assumed drift in alcohol, for those were the prohibition years. James Branch Cabell wrote sentimental fables which his colleagues wisely labelled "escape literature." Ernest Hemingway re-

duced story-telling to a cross between the newspaper and the *Pilgrim's Progress*. Gertrude Stein's word-games had their greatest vogue; was it not she who spoke of those around her as a "lost generation"? Sherwood Anderson sat at the feet of Gertrude Stein. The life of Harry Crosby, Left-Bank dilettante who tore through the twenties in airplanes to end as a sordid suicide, expressed the emptiness of the years. Writers found it impossible to follow a consistent development; against the better dictates of instinct and art they changed "manner" with every book. Drama received its first attack from the talking pictures. Literary reputations were made one night and forgotten the next. Between the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the stock-market crash in New York, art and literature steered a hazy, often alcoholic course, through outwardly serene years, and revealed with extraordinary sureness their hopeless drift.

The world crisis came as a rude and even beneficent awakening. Fascism followed with a ruthless disregard for all that the thinking world cherished. There now arose a younger generation of writers sharply conscious of struggle and crisis, unemployment and world economic disaster. But unlike O'Neill these younger men were not spectators. They had participated in the *débâcle*. Those who were in school and college during the last flurry of prosperity, now were jobless, faced with a hopeless future. A new awareness crept into the writing, as if a fog had lifted. In some cases it expressed ineffective disillusion; in many it was a forthright demand, an overwhelming question—"What are you going to do about it?" Journalism became eager and interrogatory. The social drama, dormant for years, awoke to new possibilities and literature roused itself from casual introspection and the stream of consciousness. . . . It was no longer

sufficient to state a case, plumb a soul, dissect a mood. There was an honest, searching return to the great tradition of English and American literature that links the contemporary so-called "proletarian" novelist to Dickens and his predecessors, and the dramatist to the Elizabethans.

Where was O'Neill, the worker, the sailor, the tender of cattle, during these changing years? He who, after the War had given America a realistic and serious drama, who had sought sincerely, if not always effectively, to lift a challenging voice in the theatre, this man had long ago crawled into his ivory tower. His new series of plays represented elaborate and nearly always interesting experiments in form, but all the early inspiration was gone. Retired among his books he seemed to have forgotten—strangely enough completely forgotten—that *alter ego* who had wandered over the face of the earth before becoming a successful playwright. The early life and passion were burned out; the old atmosphere of futility remained, but it was synthetic futility. The dramatist had evolved into a puppet-master, manipulating his personages in a theatric vacuum. The direct inspiration from life was gone. Instead O'Neill played with abstruse ideas and fanciful themes inspired by an inner consciousness that was not adequate to the demands he made on it.

He wrote *Lazarus Laughed*, his first experiment with classical forms and *The Great God Brown*, to which we have already alluded. He wrote *Dynamo*, an attempt to sing of the power of the machine and man's enslavement to it; but the song rang false, the machines being too great for his crude lyricism. He wrote *Ah Wilderness*, dimly reaching back into his own youth, attempting to recapture something of a boy's adolescent misgivings, but

saw his boy with the eyes of a man, and resurrected only a sad caricature. Finally, he wrote *Days without End*, his most recent play, a return to his pre-occupation with dual personality. But it did not enjoy a long run. The audiences of the thirties had become more difficult.

Standing out among these works are two plays which, because of their experimental form, their unusual length and content, deserve closer attention: *Strange Interlude* and *Mourning Becomes Electra*.

Strange Interlude was a brave attempt to give dramatic form to the Joycean stream of consciousness. O'Neill thus yielded to the most important literary obsession of the twenties. His experiment had this interest, that instead of resorting to the time-worn soliloquy or aside, which requires a very real intimacy between actor and audience, he invited his characters to murmur, *sotto voce*, their inward thoughts, as a corollary to their speeches. A soliloquy is spoken directly to the audience; these speeches are echoed thoughts which the audience is intended to overhear.

In this he really created nothing new. His Emperor Jones, or the stoker in *The Hairy Ape*, speaking their long monologues gave a much closer representation of the stream of consciousness than his characters in *Strange Interlude*. And where, in the earlier plays, the monologue served to advance the action, it tended to halt it in this play. The idea was foredoomed to failure, since objectivity is the essence of drama, and the whole art of the dramatist consists in peopling a stage and conveying thought through speech and conduct, thus evoking a representation of life. To introduce thought as a constant accompaniment to speech is to rob a drama of its fine economy, all its formal interest. The stream-of-consciousness speeches in *Strange Interlude* encumber the

play with so much excess baggage. There might have been some saving grace for these speeches had O'Neill given them poetic value. Unfortunately, he is not a poet.

Moreover, Mr. O'Neill gave himself away in his plot. Instead of choosing characters from the world of his experience, instead of revealing the consciousness of sailors, or New England farmers, or waterfront prostitutes, he remained within the confines of his readings in psychology. *Strange Interlude* is just so many dramatized case-histories from Havelock Ellis or Sigmund Freud. Nina Leeds suffers from sexual frustration and accompanying forms of hysteria. There is a dramatized Oedipus complex, and a family with hereditary insanity. Characters, scenario, thought-stream, are lifted from contemporary explorations of the unconscious. And at all times the experiment is more important to O'Neill than the play. The effect is as elusive and unreal as the analytic fiction of which Arthur Christopher Benson said: "It is as though one wandered in tortuous passages, full of beautiful and curious things, without ever reaching the rooms of the house." However, Mr. O'Neill is not imaginative enough to fill his passages with the beautiful and the curious, nor poet enough to hold our interest by his use of words.

The Broadway success of *Strange Interlude* is best explained by the excellence of the Theatre Guild production, the interest awakened by the play's novelty, and the fact that while Broadway audiences can be exigent, they are also often gullible, and clever publicity can convince them that a pretentious effort is necessarily "profound," and a profound effort necessarily requires their attendance. The less critical movie audiences laughed outright as the characters in the film version of the play registered

pained expressions while their spoken thoughts echoed through the talking-picture palaces. Nor can that laughter be ascribed to a movie audience's lack of appreciation of the finer dramatic art. As recently as this year, a correspondent of the *New York Times*, describing a performance of the play in, of all capitals, that which is likeliest to be most aware of the new psychology, Vienna, wrote: "While the work was well received as a whole, the audience that packed the theatre showed a tendency to take some of the most tragic moments humorously." *Strange Interlude* has, in fact, had little success abroad. In London it lasted only a few weeks.

Mourning Becomes Electra was quite another matter. Modelling his story of the New England Mannons on the Oresteia of Aeschylus, O'Neill wrote a clever melodrama, pitched on a plane of high hysteria, in which murder engenders murder, and suicide, suicide. During the long evening we must make acquaintance with four corpses.

The play is as long as its predecessor, but much more closely knit, being blessed with the classical framework of Greek tragedy. It consists of three plays in one: *Homecoming*, in which a frustrated wife who has taken a lover, murders her husband on his return from war; *The Hunted*, in which the daughter pursues her mother for her crime and with the aid of her brother, murders the lover, driving the mother to suicide; *The Haunted*, in which the brother, now cut from his mother's apron-strings, seeks escape in suicide. The remaining Mannon, the stoical murderous Lavinia-Electra, returns to the New England house to live with the ghosts. A chorus of village rustics in homely language comments on these lurid episodes.

I remember distinctly the feeling of unreality and

nightmare this play gave me when I first saw it in New York. One heaved a sigh of relief as suicide followed suicide, glad that the characters thus put themselves out of their misery. Later, when I had occasion to review the road-show in Montreal, I wrote under the immediate impression of seeing it for a second time: "Not without a certain presumptuousness Mr. O'Neill has turned to the Oresteia of Aeschylus and attempted to give us a modern tragedy that would have, he hoped, something of the sweep and grandeur of the Greek. It hasn't. In the Greek tragedy all is external and objective; the people are in the hands of a relentless fate that lifts them off their feet . . . and the audience experiences an inevitable catharsis . . . . But Mr. O'Neill turns the wrong end of the telescope to his audience and he turns it on to a petty business. The New England Mannons, all-subjective and internal, and each of them illustrating some psychological complex, haven't the stuff of great tragedy in them. They just succeed in being pathetic; until finally one is watching an Oedipus complex talking to an Electra complex and realizes that the play has come not from life but from the pages of a psychology textbook . . . . The people have nothing to recommend them; they do not seem to be worth, with their perpetual self-laceration, all the power the dramatist expends on them. One comes away feeling sorry, and that is all . . . And one feels that even O'Neill hasn't any pity for his people."

* * * * *

Yes, Mr. O'Neill in the 1920's was writing for the 1930's, and in the present decade he is most definitely a dramatist of the futile 1920's. He made his contribution to the American theatre early in his career; thereafter his genius ceased to function. The young men whose

plays are finding audiences in New York to-day owe to him their use of realistic dialogue, their experimental approach to the theatre, their sincere desire to show in dramatic action sailors and stevedores, taxi-drivers and cotton-spinners—in fact the whole of the working world, instead of merely the world of the drawing-room which hitherto seemed to be regarded as the sole terrain of the playwright.

And they have gone far beyond O'Neill. Their characters ask for positive action and a solution to their wrongs: attacked, they strike back courageously; defeated, they are ready to fight beyond defeat. That is why *The Hairy Ape*, or any of O'Neill's sea plays, become merely negative pictures when placed beside *Let Freedom Ring*, *Stevedore*, *Black Pit*, or *Waiting for Lefty*. These plays are the works of more subtle and more understanding minds than Mr. O'Neill's, young men who have not merely been touched by the reality of things, but have been and are a part of that reality.

The author of *Mourning Becomes Electra* and *Strange Interlude* is young enough to change, shrewd enough a dramatist to be able, perhaps, in the not-too-distant future, to report on the new world that has come up around him. But I fear that at best it will be but a superior sort of dramatic reporting. The later O'Neill may very well remain a casual experimentalist, lost in a world in which art already seems to count for so little beside the overshadowing moral destructiveness created by the existence of mighty armies, and the thought of their potential destructiveness when they will go to battle.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917-1937

R. Flenley

I

"Russia," remarked a French traveller in 1607, "is not an open country, into which one can enter to learn the language, find out this and that, and then depart. For besides the fact that it is shut off, everything there is so secret that it is very difficult to learn the truth about anything, unless one has seen it with one's own eyes." This *goût du secret* persisted in Russia down to, and even after, the fall of the Tsarist régime. As recently as 1934 one of the best-known American correspondents in Russia, W. H. Chamberlin, after a dozen years in the country, found it impossible to get at the truth regarding the famine in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Yet the past few years have witnessed the publication of a considerable amount of material about both the new and the old Russia, and this, coupled with the fact that it is now just twenty years since the revolution of 1917 took place, justifies an attempt to chart its course and estimate its meaning.

At two o'clock on the morning of November 8, 1917 (October 26 by the then Russian calendar, hence the "October" Revolution), the Bolshevist forces poured like a tide into the Winter Palace in Petrograd, the seat of the provisional republican government headed by Kerensky, and arrested the members of the cabinet. They had already seized the railway stations, the postal, telegraph, and telephone offices, and the state bank. They held the great fortress of Peter and Paul, and had a cruiser stationed on the Neva ready to bombard the

Winter Palace if necessary. But the government was defenceless. Its leader, Kerensky, had departed hours before to bring troops to save the capital—and did not return. It had no option but to surrender. On the evening of the same day, Lenin appeared before the tumultuous Congress of Soviets, which had just assembled, and announced, "We shall now proceed to construct the Socialist Order."

The Bolshevist seizure of Petrograd, though sudden, was not unheralded. Under the grinding pressure of the War, the Tsarist régime had swiftly dissolved, melting away like that great ice palace Alexander I had once built on the Neva to entertain his foreign guests. The abdication of Nicholas II, in March, 1917, gave formal recognition to the dissolution, and was followed by a period of seven-and-a-half months marked above all by a "lack of governance." There was acute party strife, continuous political crisis, and a succession of provisional governments, the latest of them headed by Kerensky. The attempt by Kornilov to end the confusion by the establishment of a military dictatorship failed, and by its failure hastened the victory of Bolshevism. There were days of demonstration, agitations, attempts at insurrection, growing disorders in the factories in and about the capital. The peasantry began to seize by force the land for which they hungered. The army began to disintegrate, and as prices rose and food became scarcer the cry of "peace and bread" became stronger. Sukhanov, whom Trotsky dismisses as "a democratic politician of a socialist colouring," gives in his *Memoirs* a graphic summary of the growing anarchy:

> Lynchings, breaking into houses and shops, acts of violence against officers, provincial authorities, private persons, arbitrary arrests, seizures and acts of vengeance were registered daily in dozens and

hundreds. Burnings and lootings of manor houses increased in the villages. There were not a few excesses amongst the workers against the factory administrators, owners, and foremen. . . . Masses of deserters appeared in the rear and at the front. Soldiers, without any permission, poured homewards in enormous floods. They filled up all the trains, attacking the officials, throwing out passengers. . . . And in the cities they overcrowded and destroyed the street-cars and boulevards, filled up all public places. There also one heard of drunkenness and disorder.

It was the great and growing confusion, approaching to chaos, which gave the Bolshevists their opportunity. Trotsky had returned from America in May; Lenin, from Switzerland, in the famous sealed car across Germany, in September. We cannot say that the success of their attempt at revolution was inevitable. Trotsky himself declares that "if the Bolshevists had not seized the power in October and November, in all probability they would not have seized it at all."[1] But in the prevailing confusion, the Petrograd Soviet, with Trotsky as president, and urged on by Lenin (then in hiding from arrest), made a bid for power. In two days, almost without fighting, they succeeded in gaining control of the capital. That was, of course, the beginning rather than the end. Indeed, we should hesitate to say that the Russian Revolution has ended yet. Trotsky, in his latest book, *The Revolution Betrayed*, argues that a new revolution is "inevitable." Yet whatever the future may hold for Russia, enough time has elapsed since the *Ten Days that Shook the World* (as the American journalist John Reed entitled his vivid if confused account of the happenings in Petrograd) for us to mark the course the revolution took and to attempt to measure its significance.

The period of the Russian Revolution divides naturally into four stages. The first of these, which may be

[1] *The Russian Revolution*, p 1004.

said to have opened with the Revolution of 1905 and the succeeding attempt at parliamentary government, ended with the Bolshevist seizure of the capital in November, 1917. The second lasted from November, 1917, to 1921, and included both the civil and foreign wars, and the attempt to introduce what became known as "War Communism." The third covered the years 1921-8, and was marked by the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) of compromise, and by the struggle over the succession to Lenin, who died in 1924. The fourth stage carries us to the present day. It is the period of Stalin, of the first and second Five Year Plans, and appears to culminate in the new constitution passed in December, 1936.

There is an obvious parallel between these stages and those followed by the "*bourgeois*" French Revolution of 1789. There, too, the revolution began with a period (stage one) of social and political reform (1789-92), ending with the overthrow of the monarchy, the setting up of provisional republican government, the increasingly violent struggle between parties for control, and the ultimate triumph of the Jacobins (as of the Bolshevists in Russia). There ensued (stage two) several years of foreign and civil war, in which the new régime was ultimately successful, and of experiment in political, social, and religious policy, which was less successful. These years from 1792 to the death of Robespierre (Thermidor, 1794) correspond to the years 1917-21 in Russia. In both cases there followed a turn to a more moderate régime, that of the Directory in France, that of the New Economic Policy in Russia. In France this proved the prelude to the dictatorship of Napoleon as leader of the army, in Russia to the dictatorship of Stalin as leader of the Communist party. Adequately to carry through this parallel would require at least an

article in itself. But the parallel is there, and no emphasis on the differences between "*bourgeois*" and "proletarian" revolutions destroys it. And the parallel has its value in tracing the course of the Russian Revolution from November, 1917, onwards, to which we must now turn.

II

The period 1917-21 was, of course, in some ways the most decisive one, for it saw Bolshevism overcome its enemies within the country, and make terms with those without. (In the case of France the foreign war continued in part, which helps to account for the fact that the army ultimately took over the revolution.) Russia has (or rather had) two capital cities, and after winning Petrograd it was vital for the Bolshevists to gain control of Moscow. This they accomplished after a week's heavy fighting, and by the close of 1917 they were masters of northern and central Russia, the heart and strategic centre of the country, with control of the existing railway communications. They had the support of the majority of the town workers, the peasants, and the soldiers and sailors: the peasants wanted the land, the soldiers wanted peace. Against them were their rivals the Menshevists, many of the Social Revolutionaries, the *bourgeoisie*, the landlords, army officers, monarchists, and conservatives. The Cossack country of the south, especially round the Don, provided a natural centre for the opposition forces, and to the standard raised there by Kaledin, Ataman of the Don Cossacks, recruits flowed from all quarters to form the Volunteer Army commanded successively by Alekseev, Kornilov, Denikin, and finally Wrangel. The conflict of this "White" army with the "Red" army, raised early in 1918, was the most decisive struggle of the

revolution. Alexei Tolstoy, in his novel *Darkness and Dawn*, well portrays its confusion and tragedy, over a front nearly one thousand miles long. The Whites reached their highest point, and the Bolshevists their most dangerous crisis, in the fall of 1919, when Denikin got to Orel, two hundred and fifty miles from Moscow, just when Yudenitch threatened Petrograd from the west. But both enterprises failed, and the Red army was able to move steadily southwards until, just three years after the seizure of Petrograd, Wrangel was forced to evacuate the Crimea.

The struggle which distracted Russia during these years was much more complicated than the foregoing would suggest. We may omit reference to the conflict in the remoter parts of the former Russian Empire, in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, but the threat from Siberia was at one time quite serious, since Kolchak, who had set up a dictatorship at Omsk in November, 1918, threatened the line of the Volga in the spring of 1919. The tide turned, however, in the summer of that year, and Kolchak was "liquidated" in February, 1920. The most urgent and serious war-issue faced by the Bolshevists when they seized power was, however, the war with Germany. They owed their victory in Petrograd in no small measure to their support of the demand for immediate peace. But Germany, already successful on the weaker eastern front, put forward the harshest terms. There was a severe internal struggle within the new government, until in the end they gave way; they had indeed little option. The resultant treaty of Brest Litovsk cut off most of the western borderlands, from Finland southwards, and even, for a time, the vastly more important Ukraine. Not until after the German defeat in the west, followed by the revolution in Germany

itself, was the Ukraine open first to anarchy (*e.g.*, Makhno in 1919) and then to incorporation in Soviet Russia. Had not the Allies defeated Germany, the fate of the revolution and the civil war, not least in the Ukraine, would have been very different.

To that extent the four western allies aided the Bolshevists. At the same time, however, we find them interfering actively and directly against the Bolshevists, at first as part of the general conflict with the Central Powers, but later in antagonism to the new régime, which was equally antagonistic to them, with its annulment of the Tsarist foreign debts and its anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist propaganda. The allied intervention, whether in the Baltic, the White Sea, the south-east, or Siberia, slowed up but did not prevent the Bolshevist victory. Undoubtedly it aided the Baltic republics to secure their independence, and checked Bolshevist efforts to stir up revolution in western and central Europe. But it inevitably left behind a legacy of enmity, and this was fostered by the activities of the Third International.

By the end of 1920, indeed before, the Bolshevists had secured control of Russia. It was at great cost. Soviet Russia emerged shrunken by the loss of the fruits of two hundred years of expansion along its western borders. The civil war, coming on top of the enormously expensive conflict with Germany and Austria, made havoc of the economic life of the country. It was little wonder that famine, epidemic before, reached major proportions in 1921, when millions perished despite foreign efforts at relief. Terrorism and savagery flourished on both sides during the civil war. The Bolshevists, like the Jacobins, used the Red Terror to destroy their enemies, avowedly and systematically. The *Cheka* was the chief agent, and it is estimated by a careful observer, Chamberlin, that

"about fifty thousand persons were put to death in the course of the Red Terror during the period of the Civil War."[2] The Whites, partly in revenge, were no more merciful to the Bolshevists they captured. Russia appeared by the close of the war to be sinking back into savagery.

Terrorism and war did not absorb the whole of Bolshevist activities during this period. In government the outstanding feature was the concentration of all authority in the hands of the Council of People's Commissars, with the Communist party behind it. Other parties or groups, as the Social Revolutionaries and the Menshevists, were "liquidated." The Constituent Assembly called by the provisional government was dismissed after one meeting (in January, 1918). And although the Fifth Congress of Soviets in July, 1918, adopted a Constitution which declared (article one) that "all central and local authority belongs to the Soviets," in fact, under the pressure of the war, control was centralized in the hands of Lenin and his associates. The Communist party, reorganized and disciplined as far as possible, controlled the soviets and the trade-unions through its local "cells," and in general acted as the spearhead of the revolution.

In fulfilment of the pledge "to construct the Socialist Order," the Bolshevists immediately after the seizure of the capital passed a number of decrees of the most sweeping character. They declared the land and the banks national property, nationalized foreign trade and shipping, annulled the vast foreign debts of Russia, set up a supreme economic council with power to confiscate capitalistic enterprises, separated the church from the state, changed the marriage and divorce laws, and de-

[2] *History of the Russian Revolution*, II, p. 75.

clared world revolution to be the aim of the new government. Although some of these early decrees were declaratory rather than practical, the policy of nationalization and centralized state control was continued during the next few years. Under this "War Communism" the production of raw materials, manufacture large and small, trade, the railways, private property of all kinds, the distribution of food, all passed into the hands of the new Soviet state. A universal obligation to work became a fundamental of the new order: "He shall not eat who does not work." The attempt was made to abolish a money economy, and to substitute a "natural" economy, in which all transactions were made in kind.

In contrast with their success in the war, however, the Bolshevists failed in their policy of "War Communism." The system was put into effect under enormous difficulties, caused by the general exhaustion and economic dislocation, and the strain of the war. The railways, for example, were in a lamentable condition. On top of this came a torrent of hasty legislation, the sweeping away of what trained direction and management there was, and excessive centralization. There was a general spirit of indiscipline, and financial chaos. There had been mismanagement and corruption in the old Russia; they were not eliminated now.

The general result was calamitous. Manufacture declined in 1920 to 13 per cent. of its volume in 1913. Most serious, however, was the discontent of the peasantry. They had been given the "use" of the land, to till for themselves, but not for their own advantage. Their markets had disappeared, their live-stock was greatly reduced, and now the new government proceeded to take away from them their surplus products, which it needed for the starving cities, and even, for a time, to

tax them. Discontent grew and production fell, despite the efforts of Trotsky to regiment agricultural production, and there were peasant risings in certain of the provinces. The winter of 1920-1 was the hungriest in Russia for many years. The final blow was the sudden mutiny of the sailors in Kronstadt, the former stronghold of Bolshevism, against the dictatorship of the Communist party, demanding free soviets, and greater equality and freedom. The rising was bloodily suppressed, but it brought matters to a head: War Communism had proved a failure, and Lenin made what he admitted was a "strategic retreat," to the N.E.P.

III

The period of the New Economic Policy lasted from 1921 to 1928, and was marked by compromise in the economic field, and later by the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin for the succession to Lenin. In its compromise quality, and also in the struggle between personalities for control of the revolution, it corresponds to the years 1794-9, when the Thermidorian reaction crystallized into the Directory, and Barras fought with his fellow directors for power. The main feature of the new policy in Russia was the abolition of the requisitioning of the surplus produce of the peasants. Instead, the peasant paid a tax, at first in kind, then in money, after which he was free to dispose of his surplus as he wished. With this concession came also the abolition of the compulsory labour and labour army schemes, the restoration of a regular currency and internal stabilization of the rouble, greater freedom of management in industry, limited freedom of private trade and even of small industry, the invitation to foreign capital to enter Russia. Private shops were allowed to open.

There is no doubt that the N.E.P. was strategically sound. There was a marked economic recovery, aided by better harvests in 1922 and 1923, as by the fact that the war was over. True, there was a great increase in the number of independent farmers, the *kulaks* and the "Nepmen" flourished, but Lenin was justified in his view that the concessions to capitalism were not large enough seriously to endanger the Communist control over Russia. It was, he argued, state capitalism, and not dangerous. The new régime, organized in 1918 as the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic) now in 1922 became the U.S.S.R. (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics) including not merely the R.S.F.S.R. (Russia) but half a dozen other federated republics, from the Ukraine to Central Asia. Thus the various nationalities of the Soviet Union received formal recognition as living entities. The system of soviets of 1918 was retained, but control remained in the hands of the leaders of the Communist party, and the party itself was given a new and more rigid organization in 1925.

But Lenin did not live to see the later development of the N.E.P., and we do not know what policy he would have pursued had he lived. Incapacitated by a stroke in 1922, he died in January, 1924, and immediately there began the epic contest for the succession between Stalin and Trotsky. This post-Thermidorian rivalry was in part a struggle for power between rivals, in part a conflict of ideals. Trotsky stood for the uncompromising effort towards world revolution; Stalin was concerned with the success of the revolution in the U.S.S.R., "socialism within a single country." Trotsky was the more brilliant publicist; Stalin, the shrewder politician. Both laid claim to the mantle of Lenin, but Stalin had made better preparations for his succession. As secretary-general of

the Communist party he had greater control over the party. As successor to Lenin in the chairmanship of the all-important *politburo* (chief sub-committee of the central committee of the party) he organized victory for himself and crushed the "left deviation," represented by Trotsky and his adherents. In 1927 Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were expelled from the Communist party, and although the two former recanted Trotsky was recalcitrant, and in 1929 was deported, to begin the long Odyssey from Turkey to Mexico. Presumably Stalin hesitated to confer on his powerful opponent the crown of martyrdom—a hesitation he must since have regretted.

IV

Stalin's victory over Trotsky ushered in the fourth stage of the revolution, reaching from 1928 to the present time. It has been marked by the turn from the N.E.P. to the Five-Year Plans, attempting to establish "socialism within a single country." At first sight, the parallel with the French Revolution breaks down here, for Stalin was neither a newcomer nor has he been a conquering general, like Napoleon after Brumaire. But dictatorship was characteristic of both régimes, and Napoleon was a great legislator as well as a soldier, and claimed, like Stalin, to be fulfilling the revolution. Whether the new Russian constitution offers any parallel to Napoleon's constitution of 1815, his *Acte additionnel*, it is too soon to say.

The first Five-Year Plan drawn up by *Gosplan*, the State Planning Commission (though Trotsky declares his own Left Opposition were the real authors of the plan), affected both industry and agriculture. For the former the plan envisaged a vast expansion by the state of the

supply of raw materials, the provision of hydro-electric power, of new railways, of manufactured goods, particularly in "heavy" industry. It meant the end of the N.E.P. concessions to private initiative. For agriculture, where by 1928 there were some twenty-six million small holdings, with over ninety-five per cent. of the land in private holdings, the plan implied the liquidation of the better-off peasants, the *kulaks*, and the general substitution for private holdings of either state farming or "collective" agriculture. This liquidation was carried out in the years after 1929, and in the most ruthless fashion. It succeeded, but at the cost of the serious reduction of the live-stock of the country, a shortage of wheat, and famine in the Ukraine and the Caucasus, in which several millions perished. The state farms were hardly successful; but the drive for the collectives went on steadily, until most of rural Russia was so organized. In the normal type of collective the land is held and cultivated collectively, under a board. The yield of the farm is divided between seed and the needs of maintenance, development, and social services; what remains is divided amongst the members. As defined and regulated by the new constitution of 1936 the system allows for individual tenure of garden plots, with some individually owned live-stock. Aided by good harvests, the system has undoubtedly aided production. It is not entirely free—the members can scarcely withdraw—and it does not eliminate inequalities.

Yet looking at the land problem, the major problem of Tsarist Russia, as a whole, it is clear that the revolution has ended the old system: there are no longer any privately owned large estates. The peasant has the land "for eternal use," not individually it is true, but in rural communities not wholly dissimilar to the old village

communities. He has also his "midget farm" for food, save bread and fodder. With the large-scale production of the collectives the way is open to greatly improved agricultural methods. Thus it may be that economically the land problem in Russia is solved; the problem of the organization of rural society is another matter. Already inequalities have appeared, and some stratification into richer and poorer seems bound to develop. The government's prosecutions of officials in the summer of 1937 as "crop-wreckers," together with the new concessions made by Stalin to the peasants, suggest that rural Russia may be less satisfied and peaceful than the foregoing bare summary might imply.

On the industrial side the first Five-Year Plan (followed by a second for 1933-7) was marked both by success and shortcomings. With the aid of foreign capital and direction there was unquestionably a great increase in the output of industry. Stalin in his Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist party (1934) claimed that whereas in 1913 Russian production was fifty-eight per cent. agricultural and forty-two per cent. industrial, in 1933 it was seventy per cent. industrial. "This means," he declared, "that our country has firmly and finally become an industrial country." It is to be remembered that Russia in 1917, like the United States after her Civil War, had enormous natural resources waiting to be developed. Stalin also claimed that Russian industry had "succeeded in this same period in training and forging thousands of new men and women, of new leaders in industry, a whole new stratum of new engineers and technicians." Here no doubt he was over-optimistic. The time was too short for so considerable a task, and there was, in fact, much loss and wastage in industry. Despite the great efforts put forth, the final

achievements of the first Plan were less complete than earlier estimates of its success indicated. And the concentration on heavy industry was achieved partly at the expense of "consumers' goods," the production of which lagged far behind the growing demand.

Yet the achievement was sufficiently remarkable, as Stalingrad, Magnitogorsk, and Dniepostroy show, and the progress has been continued during the second Five-Year Plan, in the production of raw materials and metals, in heavy industry, in communications (canals and railways), in the technical equipment of the army, and even in consumers' goods. Housing is lamentably behind, but that is partly due to the general increase in demand. Here, as elsewhere, the comparison must be with the Tsarist régime, and there is no question but that Russian industry has developed remarkably since 1914, and that the condition of the greatly increased army of industrial workers is vastly improved. It is quite impossible in a brief sketch like this to go into details either of industrial organization or of wages, prices, *etc.* For these the reader may be referred to the comprehensive account of the Webbs, *Soviet Communism.* Since 1928 wages have greatly increased, and in addition to wages proper, the Russian workman receives many social benefits not necessarily included elsewhere, so that the condition of the industrial worker in Russia, if not yet equal to that of his fellow in Scandinavia, Britain, Canada, or the United States, is far better than it was under the old régime. Thus, measured in terms of the material welfare of the industrial worker, the revolution has accomplished a good deal. No doubt production would have increased, and conditions improved, under any form of government conceivable in Russia during the past twenty years. The Bolshevist revolution, at a price, accelerated the

process, and carried it further, in all probability, than it would have been carried under another régime in the same time. Here again, aided by the change to payment of wages by piece work in 1934, inequalities have developed, and something resembling a petty *bourgeoisie* seems to be emerging. Indeed it has already emerged as a result of the vast development of bureaucracy, which creates another link between the new and the old Russia.

V

So far we have been concerned with the Bolshevist seizure of power, the defeat of its enemies, and the attempt to build up an agrarian and industrial system which would conform to Marxian-Leninist views as interpreted by Stalin and his associates. But that is, of course, far from the whole story. The Bolshevists rightly saw that if their revolution was to succeed the peoples of the U.S.S.R. must be educated, and educated in the new faith. In 1917 the vast majority of the one hundred and seventy million people of the old Eurasian Empire (Stepun, in *The Russian Soul and Revolution*, says eighty per cent.) were illiterate peasants. Their westernization had begun, but, speaking generally, hardly more than begun. Largely through the agency of the Communist party, the spearhead of the revolution, their education was now carried on with a zest and energy which Peter the Great, the initiator of westernization for Russia, would perforce have admired. Efforts were concentrated on the younger generation, and cinema and radio, factory and school, membership of the *Comsomol*, of the soviets, the trade-unions and the collective farms, all contributed to this end. And the whole process of education, a gigantic task in a realm in which over one hundred languages are spoken, has been utilized in

building up the belief that Russian Communism (as defined by authority) is the best form of social and economic organization. Since Communism and Science contain all that is necessary for human welfare and happiness, there was no need for a Christian God or a Christian Church: hence a policy of "anti-godism" alternating with "sceptical neutrality"—though there is a call at the moment for "broader anti-religious work," whatever that may imply, to meet an unexpected revival of religion.

The Bolshevist revolution did not develop in a vacuum. Both its early days and its later history were profoundly affected by external conditions. The legacy of foreign antagonism, fruit in large measure of the avowed policy of world revolution and the connection of the new régime with the Third International, inevitably prejudiced the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. But the obvious need for peace to develop "socialism within a single country," and the need also for foreign trade and foreign capital, induced Stalin to adopt a less bellicose attitude to the outside world. The advent of Naziism in Germany and the more aggressive policy of Japan in Asia, culminating in the German-Japanese alliance, both further encouraged friendly relations with other powers, as seen in the entry into the League of Nations and the recent treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, and encouraged nationalism within the U.S.S.R. itself. The Soviet State, far from "withering away" as the earlier Bolshevist theory prophesied, became the embodiment of a nationalism hardly distinguishable from *bourgeois* nationalism; Communism became not merely compatible with patriotism, but its ardent supporter. The Red Army was enlarged and fostered; the officers' corps was restored; discipline was stiffened up, and con-

scription was included in the new constitution. "Counter-revolutionary activity" was no longer a domestic affair, but (as the recent trials show) was bound up with the threat of foreign invasion.

The growth of nationalism in Soviet Russia is of interest in a broader way. The Webbs end their comprehensive survey of the Soviet system by arguing that the Bolshevists have indeed created a new civilization. That depends on one's definition of civilization, and to the writer the claim seems absurdly excessive. All the elements of the Soviet system originated within western civilization, and not merely in its nationalism, but in other developments, the Soviet régime has recently appeared to be gravitating towards liberal-democratic western views, and so towards the Liberal tradition of pre-revolutionary Russia. This trend is evidenced in Soviet legislation of the past three years dealing with many aspects of national life. The concession to the peasant's desire to have some property of his own has been mentioned already. In religion persecution was more specifically disavowed, and the new constitution guarantees (art. 124) "freedom of religious worship" to all. The educational system has been radically changed: the need for greater discipline in the schools is recognized, examinations (abolished in 1917) have been restored, academic titles revived, classical studies re-introduced, and restrictions to entrance to the universities on account of birth or origin abolished. The family has become more important again, as the changes in the divorce laws and the abolition of abortion (1936) show.

VI

The most outstanding evidence of the recent trend in Russia, however, is provided by the new constitution,

promised in 1935, published in June, 1936, and adopted (with minor modifications) by the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1936. This lengthy and interesting document, which cannot be here summarized, does not change the general character of the organization of the U.S.S.R., which remains a federation, "a socialist state of workers and peasants" (art. 1), in which "all power belongs to the toilers of city and village as represented by the soviets of toilers' deputies" (art. 3). Association of the various republics in the U.S.S.R. is declared to be voluntary (art. 17). The liberal-democratic tendency is shown in the system of election to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., the federal legislature. All men and women have the vote "irrespective of racial and national affiliation, religion, educational status, social origin, property status or past activities." The suffrage is henceforth to be direct, and the secret ballot is included (arts. 134-5). Further, by articles 125 and 127 in the section entitled "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens" (which reminds us of *bourgeois* France in 1789, and *bourgeois* Germany in 1848 and 1919) all citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of meeting and organization, and inviolability of person. Here, it is worth noting, occurs the sole mention in the constitution of the Communist party, as "the vanguard of the toilers." We need not follow the details of the organization of federal and union-republican legislative, executive, and judicial powers, which conform in general to those of other federal democratic states, save that the economic functions of the component parts of this socialist state are necessarily larger: the federal authority deals with heavy industry, the Union Republics with food, light industry, agriculture, timber, and live-stock.

This constitution has been claimed by Stalin to be "the most democratic in the world," and Krilenko describes it as "the great Stalin constitution in which are embodied the greatest achievements of socialism in every sphere of life: political, economic, cultural, and social." Trotsky in his latest attack on Stalin (*The Revolution Betrayed*) declares that it is not truly democratic, since it was prepared "secretly" and the people were not free to criticize it. His main charge against the new constitution, however, is that it is neither socialist nor communist, but a betrayal of the revolution to "*bourgeois* democracy." The western adherent of "*bourgeois* democracy," unless he is a political theorist concerned with the difficult task of exactly defining "socialism" and "communism" will be less concerned with this criticism. Recognizing what, to him, are the undoubted merits of the constitution, he will be more inclined to ask, Will it work? In particular, can this newer freedom be reconciled with the all-embracing control exercised by Stalin, the *politburo* and the Communist party. "I doubt," says Gide in his recent criticism of the U.S.S.R., "whether in any country in the world, even in Hitler's Germany, thought is less free than in Soviet Russia." Yet if the new national parliament is to be more than a Nazi *Reichstag*, if the other privileges enshrined in the new constitution are to have any real meaning, there must be a real change in the whole spirit and nature of the government of the Soviet Union.

"Peaceful change" of a radical kind is difficult, if not dangerous, in internal as in international affairs. "Life has become better, Comrades; life has become more joyous," said Stalin in 1936. Yet in August of that year there occurred the extraordinary trials of the old Bolshevists Zinoviev, Kamenev, and over a dozen others, who were condemned and shot; and in January, 1937,

came the trial of Radek the Soviet publicist, and sixteen others, who were also condemned, though not all of them to death. All the accused in both trials had pleaded guilty to treason or plots of an almost fantastic nature, with Trotsky as the arch-conspirator. These trials convey to the outside observer less of joyousness than of suspicion and ruthless repression, bred of fear, on the part of the Soviet government, and, on the side of the accused, of a psychology scarcely found outside the pages of Dostoievsky. During the spring and early summer of this year these trials have been followed by arrests and executions involving Communist and non-Communist officials of every class and occupation, from White Russia to Siberia, on charges of sabotage in industry, spying for foreign powers, Trotskyism, crop-wrecking, persecution of the peasants, *etc.* Some of the makers of the new constitution have already disappeared. The sacred Red Army has been involved, with the demand for its "re-communization," and the elimination of such outstanding leaders as Tukachevsky. Nor can we be sure that this new purge is yet over.

It may be that these trials, arrests, and disappearances, and the impression they create outside Russia, have little to do with the mass of the people of the U.S.S.R. They do not affect the unquestioned improvement in material conditions resulting from the revolution; nor do they necessarily portend any very serious threat to the existing régime. But they illustrate the difficulty of delivering judgment either on the future of the revolution or, more immediately, on the probability of the success of the new constitution. Indeed, we are almost driven back to that remark of the seventeenth-century traveller with which this article opened, or to that other remark, this time by a Russian, that "things that do not happen, occur in Russia."

ASTRONOMY FROM CONSTELLATIONS TO ATOMS

FRANK ALLEN

"HE stretcheth out the north over empty space and hangeth the earth upon nothing." Thus eloquently the Patriarch Job uttered his lofty panegyric on the works of the Almighty; and in one brief but majestic sentence, breathing limitless power and mystery, he comprehended the most significant astronomical knowledge of antiquity.

The challenge of the stars has been answered with increasing insight and resourcefulness in a logical succession of four general eras of developing knowledge. Earliest of all came the pictorial or statical age, in which the singular idea of partitioning the sky into fanciful constellations was boldly conceived and partly executed. The second, or kinematical, era embraced the rise, domination, and fall of the Ptolemaic system of the heavens and the Copernican restoration of the primitive heliocentric theory, and culminated in the discovery of the laws of planetary orbits. In the third, or dynamical, era, universal gravitation was established as the basic force of nature, and the consequences of its action were mathematically elucidated. The fourth and present era of physical astronomy has among its subjects of inquiry the composition, structure, and development of the heavenly bodies and their relation to space. Each era has had a fairly definite epoch for its beginning, but the overlapping ages, except the first, have yet no periods to mark their close.

I

In the northern highlands of Asia Minor astronomy probably had its birth. At the inception of the pictorial

era, when, between four and five thousand years ago, the visible portion of the sky was fancifully divided into constellations to depict the most memorable events in the earliest history of the race, only those stars were included which shone above the horizon in latitudes five hundred miles north of Babylon. Perhaps, in the high antiquity of that pictorial age, the Akkadian shepherds in their mountain pastures thus splendidly relieved the watchful tedium of the night, and later brought their unique fancies with them, when in search of a softer climate and a more luxurious home they descended into the languorous plains of Mesopotamia.

Of the forty-eight constellations earliest delineated, as the late Mr. Maunder of the Greenwich Observatory has noted, no less than fourteen are directly, and eight are indirectly, representative of incidents recorded in the first ten chapters of Genesis. The remainder depict events of which even the tradition has perished.

The Serpent, Hydra, of Eden, winds its sinuous form along the celestial equator of that period for nearly one-third of its course. To emphasize the significance of its origin, another Serpent lies partly along the equator and then perpendicularly rears its front precisely to the zenith along the autumnal equinox; while the Man, the Serpent-holder, presses one foot on the head of the Scorpion which curves its venomous tail to sting his other heel. With evident design, this bold constellation is situated so that the foot upon the Scorpion occupied the important triple point where, at that remote time, the celestial equator, the ecliptic, and the autumnal equinox intersected. Close by is Hercules, or the Kneeler, as he was simply and most anciently called, with one foot on the great Northern Dragon.

"I will put enmity between thee and the woman,"

was the condemnation of the serpent, "and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head and thou shalt bruise his heel." This great primeval prophecy, which aptly epitomizes in the history of mankind, the aeonic struggle of the forces of elevation against those of debasement, never more menacing than to-day, thus receives a twofold representation in the resplendent pictures of the skies.

Other striking events are similarly commemorated. Near the Mountain lies the Ship, with the messenger Raven not far distant. The bow in the cloud was the post-diluvial token of divine reconciliation; and in the cloud of smoke, the Milky Way, ascending from the Altar of sacrifice, glitters the covenant Bow of Sagittarius. The most brilliant of all constellations, known to Job as the Fool or the Impious One, but to the Greeks and to the modern world as Orion, depicts Nimrod, "the mighty hunter before the Lord," springing up, club in hand, to attack the Bull. The guardian cherubic forms of Eden, named by Ezekiel as the Lion, Man, Bull, and Eagle, are respectively placed as the upholders of the sky in the four most significant positions of that period, the summer and winter solstices and the vernal and autumnal equinoxes, along or, in the case of the Eagle, near the ecliptic. Even in that far antiquity the cardinal points of the heavens were recognized.

The constellations were doubtless familiar to Abraham before he left his ancestral home in Ur of the Chaldees to found a new nation and era. By oral communication the knowledge passed to his descendants, as is curiously attested by the provocative dream of Joseph, in which "the sun, moon and eleven stars," the eleven constellations of the zodiac, bowed down to him, the twelfth. Appropriately to the times of its early composition, the

astronomical allusions of the Old Testament are chiefly to the constellations. By the author of the Book of Job constellational astronomy was mainly employed, and convincingly attests the traditional antiquity of its composition. As the scholars of Chaldea and Egypt, the nations from which the Hebrews derived their culture, held and probably originated the heliocentric theory of the solar system, it may be remarked in passing that the Old Testament was composed under its influence, but it was repeatedly translated into English under the powerful, though declining, authority of the opposing geocentric system, which had been completed by Ptolemy only in the second century of our era. The recognition of these historical facts, which (so far as I am aware) have been overlooked by biblical scholars, will signally clarify occasional misleading renderings of the text.

The Greek astronomers not only increased the number of the constellations, but even presumed to replace the names of some of the earlier groups of stars with those of the heroes and the incidents of their own mythology. Further additions have been made in modern times as geographical exploration brought the southern sky into view. The limit of development was reached when all the stars of the celestial sphere were finally grouped in eighty-nine commemorative constellations.

II

In Chaldea astronomy entered upon the second era of development, the kinematical age, in which observations were directed to the motions of the planets and the eclipses of the sun and moon. As early as the eighth century before our era, the chief cities of Mesopotamia had established observatories and equipped them with instruments now unknown. Throughout the clear starlit

nights of that astronomically favoured land, the accomplished "watchers of the skies" accurately noted the seasonal, yearly, and secular changes in the appearance of the heavens, and regularly sent their reports to the king. They distinguished the planets from the stars, determined their periodic relations to each other, and traced their pathways through the constellations along the ecliptic. They identified Hesperus, the evening, with Phosphorus, the morning star, which in reality are the two brilliant appearances of the planet Venus at its greatest eastern and western elongations. They recognized the Saros, the eighteen-year cycle of lunar eclipses. To them, rather than to Hipparchus, the most illustrious astronomer of the pre-Christian era, is now ascribed the discovery of the obliquity of the ecliptic and of the vast twenty-six thousand year cycle of the precession of the equinoxes, or the apparent retrograde motion of the sun through the constellations of the zodiac. The Chaldeans, as well as the Egyptians, were aware of the spherical shape of the earth, of its unsupported poising in space, "hanging upon nothing," of its diurnal rotation on its axis, and of its annual revolution around the sun.

No trace of Greek influence is found in Chaldean astronomy, while, on the contrary, the Greeks derived their first notions of this science from the Babylonians. To disseminate their views Berossus of Chaldea, in the seventh century before our era, opened a school in the island of Cos, in which Thales, the founder of Greek science and philosophy, may have been a pupil, and where perhaps he acquired the information that enabled him to make his famous prediction of the total eclipse of the sun in 585 B.C. The early flow of knowledge from east to west was facilitated by the extensive travels of the Pythagoreans. From them Aristotle evidently der-

ived the idea of the sphericity of the earth, which he supported with the arguments still used for that purpose in text-books of astronomy.

The ancient and medieval philosophers mistakenly considered rest to be the sole natural state of a body, and this error hampered astronomy until the time of Newton. They believed, therefore, that, in order to maintain the motion of bodies, forces must continually propel them. To provide mechanical forces of the only kind they knew was the purpose of the assumed crystal spheres of Ptolemy and the whirling vortices of Descartes. It is one of the most significant discoveries of Galileo and Newton that a second natural state of a body exists, in which, after it is set in motion, it continues to move with uniform velocity in a straight line when no forces of any kind act upon it. In the empty space of Newton's conception, no resistance to movement is offered, and planets accordingly require no force to keep them in steady rectilinear motion. But a force acting sideways to the line of motion is necessary to change the planet's rectilinear path into a curved orbit around the sun. Motion when changing either in magnitude or in direction, is called acceleration, and acceleration invariably requires a force to produce it. Throughout the universe, between planets and stars, the controlling force is gravitation, and in its action the secret of the order of this harmonious universe lies. The story of its immediate discovery begins with Kepler's statement of the laws of planetary orbits, and it concludes with Newton's crowning achievement, his recognition of the underlying force, the formulation of its laws, and the establishment of the gravitational system of the world.

Partly, perhaps chiefly, from ignorance of immaterial forces the Ptolemaic system had arisen in which the

supposed circular motions of the sun, the moon, the five then known planets, and the stars, were associated with the revolution of eight crystal spheres, concentric with the earth. In an ill-defined region, called the crystalline heavens, beyond even the sphere of the stars, was assumed to be located the *primum mobile*, which not only was in motion itself but also supplied the motive power to rotate the whole celestial structure.

But the cause of motion in the *primum mobile* itself was left unexplained. Such a procedure is not infrequent even in modern science. For in the ultimate problems of the origin of matter, energy, life, consciousness, and mind, it seems to be tacitly assumed that by making their beginning sufficiently remote in time or space, their existence can be taken for granted, and the difficulty, as well as the necessity, of accounting for them becomes proportionately lessened. The logician recognizes this infirmity of reason under the term *petitio principii*; it is popularly known by the less dignified but more expressive phrase, "begging the question."

Not only the Ptolemaic but all hypotheses of the world-order framed in pre-Newtonian times suffered equally from the failure to recognize the force of gravitation, invisibly woven into the basic fabric of the universe. Though Copernicus had the genius to perceive the correctness of the heliocentric system, the courage, rare in that age, to restore it to scientific thought, and the power to sustain its provisions with irrefutable arguments, he, too, left the cause of the orbital motions unexplained. Nor was Kepler, who carried the Copernican system to its loftiest kinematical development, at all happy in his conception of the animistic forces involved in its operation. In his three famous laws the "legislator of the heavens" revolutionized astronomy by proving, first, that the velocity

of a planet was not uniform in all parts of its orbit but became smaller or greater according as its distance from the sun increased or diminished; second, that the planets revolved about the sun, not in circular, but in elliptic orbits with the sun displaced from the centre to one of the *foci;* third, that throughout the solar system a single law connected the periodic times of all the planets with their distances from the sun. While notably sagacious in describing the motions, he plunged into the extreme of absurdity in explaining them. He supposed that the sun had a soul, and that the planets in rotation presented to the sun sometimes a friendly, and sometimes a hostile side, the former being attracted and the latter repelled.

In the last attempt in this era to explain the orbital motions of the planets, Descartes boldly assumed the universe to be completely full of cosmic dust, distributed not statically but in vast whirlpools or vortices with stars in their quiet centres and planets carried in orbits on their whirling rims. But the cause of the circular motions again had to be left a mystery. Actions of all kinds were held to be transmitted through the universe by pressure or impulsion; the moon, for example, caused tides by impulsion upon the oceans, which forced the water away from the centre of pressure into elevations at the sides, precisely the opposite of the condition that gravitation effects by raising the ocean towards the moon.

It is the fashion to disparage former cosmogonies. But curvilinear motions on the grand scale displayed in the solar system required a cause of equal magnitude. So difficult was the problem that only a few men, Ptolemy and Descartes conspicuously among them, had the genius even to imagine solutions. Though necessarily complete failures in their purpose (as we through Newton's superior genius are able to realize), solutions of this type, as

witnessed by Ptolemy's, were sufficiently plausible to command the assent of the learned for fifteen hundred years. They were bold, even sublime attempts to accomplish the impossible task of devising a rational system of the universe without gravitation, of accounting for orbital motions without material forces. Against the dark background of these colossal but erroneous schemes, the magnificence of Newton's achievement shines in splendid relief.

III

In the history of science Newton is more than a man; he is an epoch. The discovery of the law of gravitation, which he announced in 1685, far outranks in importance all other discoveries of principles governing the natural world. It seldom happens, however, that a new concept springs forth in complete form from a single mind like Athene full-armoured from the head of Zeus. Though Newton, by proving the law of gravitation to be the controlling force of the world, inaugurated the dynamical era of astronomy, vague ideas of the principle of attraction had been current for many ages.

The earliest philosophical speculations of the Greeks were directed to the number and nature of the elements of which all matter was composed. While different philosophers assumed but a single elementary substance, earth, air, fire, or water, Empedocles accepted all four. With still deeper insight he also recognized two attributes of matter, by which its coherence and diffusion could respectively be explained. He called these attributes "love" and "hate." But so sagacious a philosopher can scarcely have entertained the idea that matter possessed emotional qualities, and his words should probably be translated as "pull" and "push," or even as "attraction"

and "repulsion." Into the middle ages much the same idea persisted, and two mutually opposing influences were held to be operative in nature, the expansive, warmth, and the contractive, cold; the former having its seat in the sun, *centrum amoris*, and the latter appropriately in the earth, *centrum odii*. Perhaps in essence Empedoclean love differs little from Newtonian gravitation; for the nature of each is equally obscure.

Five centuries before our era, the Pythagoreans, it is believed, had speculated upon attraction as the bond of union of the earth with the sun. In the facile minds of these philosophers, therefore, the idea of gravitation possibly had its birth. Still more definitely Plutarch, in the first century of our era, set forth the principle of universal attraction, asserting that gravitation, counterbalanced by centrifugal force, keeps the moon in its orbit like a stone in a sling. But the human mind is seldom receptive of new ideas, and for fifteen centuries the truth languished in obscurity.

With Kepler's laws planetary theory, apart from forces, reached at once a climax and an *impasse*. The laws of the system were discovered, but for the laws themselves no cause was known, until in fullness of time, Newton, by one masterful stroke, effected the solution of the problem. From the first law he proved that a force of attraction acted directly between the centres of the sun and planets; from the second, that the force varies inversely as the squares of their distances apart; and from the third, that the force is proportioned only to the masses of the bodies, and not to the kinds of matter in their composition. To the cautious mind of Newton even these profound demonstrations were insufficient to establish the universality of gravitation and the accuracy of its law. If gravitation governed the orbits of the

planets around the sun, it must equally determine that of the moon around the earth. Since the direction of a body's motion, when uninfluenced by forces, is necessarily a straight line, the curvature of the moon's orbit should be due to the force of gravity between that body and the earth. Calculating the deflection of the orbit occurring in one minute, he found to his disappointment that it differed slightly from the deflection which would be created in the same time by the attraction of the earth. The discrepancy in the two calculations was not, as it transpired, due to the inaccuracy of the law but to a mistake in the measured diameter of the earth. When, some twenty years later, the true value became known, the error in Newton's calculations vanished. The identity of the force exerted between the sun and planets with that between the earth and moon, and their conformity to the same law, were thereby incontestably established.

The triumph of gravitation was soon almost complete. With matchless power and rapidity Newton applied his law to the intricate maze of planetary and lunar motions, and to the ocean tides, with such completeness that the once confused tangle emerged as an ordered system of remarkable clarity and elegance. The light of truth at last illuminated the physical world. The universe was forever cleared of crystal spheres, whirling vortices, and the animistic influences which even Kepler had assumed as the directors of planetary motions. In their place was substituted a mechanism of immaterial gravitational forces which obeyed a simple mathematical law of universal application. It was now clear why the north was stretched out over empty space and the earth hung upon nothing. The force of gravity, it was realized, kept the atmosphere and oceans in their places on the round earth.

No longer could people in the antipodes be regarded as suspended by their feet head downwards in space as the derisive critics of Columbus had contended. Henceforth "downward" meant only the directions converging from all points on the surface to the centre of the earth, and "upward" the reverse directions diverging therefrom into space.

No theory in science is properly established unless its power is predictive of new, as well as explanatory of known, phenomena. Scarcely a century ago gravitational theory achieved an amazing triumph. Uranus, the outermost planet then known, betrayed some perturbations of motion which were explicable only on the supposition that another existed still more remote. Independently of each other, Adams in England, and Leverrier in France, calculated from the law of gravitation the position and magnitude of the suspected disturber of the planetary peace. Both reached the same conclusion; and the discovery of a new planet, Neptune, within a half a degree (that is, the angular width of the moon) of its predicted position, was the brilliant reward of their genius. The triumph has been repeated. Neptune also exhibited perturbations of motion, and recently Lowell has successfully predicted the existence and position of a still more distant planet, which is now known as Pluto.

One planetary motion remained defiant of the law of gravitation. Not only does Mercury, the innermost planet, revolve around the sun, but its orbit (and indeed the orbits of all the planets) is also found to have a revolutionary motion. While the former period is less than three terrestrial months in duration, the period of the orbit is more than three million years. The cause of the latter motion remained unknown until in our own

day Einstein obtained a more accurate and comprehensive law of gravitation than that of Newton, which resolved the mystery. The new law achieved more than this striking triumph; for it also successfully predicted that a ray of starlight passing near the sun would be deflected from its rectilinear course like the curved path of a jet of water from a horizontal nozzle; and also that waves of light originating in the intense gravitational field of the sun, which is twenty-seven times that of the earth, would have their lengths increased when compared with terrestrial measurements.

IV

The present era of physical astronomy was inaugurated partly by the theories of Descartes but more especially by the discoveries of Galileo. Medieval science had inherited two ideas of a singularly barren and obstructive character. The Aristotelian distinction between the four commonplace terrestrial elements of matter and the divine *quinta essentia* in the orbs beyond the moon, passed quietly into oblivion with the acceptance of the vortex theory of Descartes, which held the basic requirement that matter throughout the universe was everywhere the same. The second idea, much more pernicious than the first, maintained that by virtue of the perfection of their creation the moon and the sun possessed absolute smoothness and uniformity of surface. To the astonishment of Galileo, his first telescopic observations revealed the surface of the moon disrupted by lofty precipitous craters, and that of the sun rent by outbursts of activity under the appearance of dark spots. The former showed evidence of enormous displays of primeval volcanic energy long since exhausted, and the latter proved the sun not the characterless luminary of

the philosophers, but a vast arena for the vigorous exercise of natural forces.

Discoveries so revolutionary in nature had in that age to fight their perilous way to victory against the menace of authority and the opposition of prejudice so extreme that the incensed adversaries of Galileo, when challenged, refused even to look through his telescope.

From the earliest times to the end of the eighteenth century, the solar system was the chief, almost the only, subject of astronomical interest, the stars being observed in position mainly for their practical importance in navigation. At the latter period Herschel, with funds supplied by George III, constructed the largest mirror telescope of his day, about four feet in diameter; and with it he made the sensational discovery of the planet Uranus, and, in addition, of nearly three thousand *nebulae*, and of comets and double and variable stars in great numbers. By him, interest in the stars was quickened into life, and astronomy lifted from the planetary to the stellar heavens.

With the construction of the giant modern telescopes and the discovery of spectrum analysis and photography, new methods of investigation of inexhaustible resourcefulness have disclosed in the sun and stars forces operating on a titanic scale. From the stars the earth receives only their radiation, but by its analysis it is possible to determine their grouping, distances, velocities, masses, densities, volumes, temperatures, composition, and state. The opening of these avenues of approach to the stellar worlds has not only enormously enlarged the scope of astronomy, but has revealed many of its problems to be the basic questions of atomic structure and of behaviour at temperatures far higher than any attainable on the earth.

The celestial bodies are now proved to be composed of

the same ninety-two elements that abound in the earth, a fact which alone is sufficient to establish the unity of the physical world. One-third of all matter is diffused uniformly throughout space with about one atom in a cubic inch. The astounding sparseness of this distribution may be realized when it is recalled that an equal volume of the earth's atmosphere contains atoms to the number of two followed by twenty noughts. Though all elements doubtless share in the diffusion, only calcium, sodium, and, quite recently, fluorine have been detected. The remaining two-thirds of the matter is concentrated chiefly in the stars. Of these probably as many as a third are double, a perplexing condition since it raises the question of whether or not stellar division is an inevitable stage of development through which the sun itself must pass, with disastrous consequences to the planets because of the enormous perturbations that would be entailed by serving two gravitational masters. The stars are grouped by thousands or millions in vast numbers of clusters and giant spiral *nebulae* or island-universes, all in rotation and separated from each other by immense distances estimated in thousands or even millions of light-years. The most majestic group of all, the galactic or "milky way" universe, contains within a volume one hundred thousand light-years in diameter, fifty billions of stars, only some three thousand of which are visible to the unaided eye. Among them is the sun with its planetary family, which, most fortunately for astronomy, is displaced from the centre to a distance of thirty-two thousand light-years, whereby it is possible to detect and measure the rotation of the galaxy itself.

Though the stars are so remote that in the greatest telescopes even the nearest of them shines merely as a point of light, yet a method has been discovered for

measuring their diameters, which occasionally reach the colossal magnitude of from one hundred to four hundred millions of miles. These giant stars are as rarefied in texture as they are enormous in volume; for their densities are as low as that of a terrestrial vacuum. If they possessed the density of the sun, which is a little greater than that of water, invisibility would be their fate; for, by Einstein's law, the light emanating from their surfaces would be curved back to its origin by the terrific force of gravitation. Since also the gravity of a star causes a warping of the surrounding space-time medium, space itself would close in around it, as Eddington remarks, and the universe shrink to nothing. Should the world become a mere point, events would cease to occur and the intuitive concept of time which is linked to events would likewise vanish. While so unique a catastrophe may be expressed in words, it cannot be conceived since, as Kant long ago pointed out, the mind is powerless to imagine that space and time do not exist.

Though stars vary enormously in volume and density, for some reason their masses lie within moderate limits; the most massive star yet discovered is only about a hundred times that of the sun. One star, however, the dwarf Companion of Sirius, the brightest star in the sky, has the enormous density of one ton for each cubic inch of its substance, while another star may greatly exceed even this high degree of compactness. This astounding condition is probably due to the loss by most of the atoms of their outer electrons, which consequently permits their massive *nuclei* to be packed closely together. As the mass of an atom resides in its central nucleus, this state would plausibly explain the high density observed.

The heat of a star does not originate from anything burning, nor from its gravitational contraction as formerly

supposed, nor from radio-active transformations such as occur on the earth, though the last two processes may be contributing factors. The chief source, it is now believed, is found in the transmutation of its atoms into radiant energy. As such changes occur within the body of the star, the temperature of its interior must be enormously high, even to the calculated value of from fifty to a hundred millions of degrees. Some of the internal heat escapes from the leaky surface of the star, which has the far lower temperature of from seven thousand degrees, in the case of the sun, to over seventy thousand degrees. It is the sun's fugitive heat that warms the earth.

A star is held together by the gravitational attraction of its parts towards the centre, which tends to cause the collapse of the tenuous body. But this attraction is opposed by the disruptive pressure of its internal radiation. Thus by two opposing forces a star is maintained in equilibrium as its secular cooling proceeds. In occasional stars it may happen that the rising temperature may increase its expansive power while gravitation remains constant. This process may continue until gravitation is overpowered and the star bursts open. A "new" star may thus be heralded throughout the universe by the sudden increase in brightness to perhaps twenty thousand times its former value. In a few months the enormous radiation becomes greatly exhausted, and the star, deprived of a vast quantity of its energy and mass, sinks, perhaps forever, into nebulous obscurity. Should this fate be reserved for the sun, a blazing flood of the now imprisoned heat would in an instant sweep the earth with destruction.

In recent years renewed interest has centred on the problem of cosmogony. The new concept of relativity in the hands of Einstein has pictured a finite but static

universe of fixed dimensions. Recently the Abbé Lemaître has shown that such a world would be unstable and hence it must either contract or expand. At the same time it has been observed that the waves of light from the remote galaxies are increased in length by progressive amounts, which is interpreted to mean that these immense groups of stars, under the pressure of some cosmic force of repulsion, are receding from the earth with velocities increasing with their distances to a present extreme of twelve thousand miles per second. If now receding, they must, at a far past but calculable time, have formed a single compact mass which for some mysterious reason exploded, thus providing an origin for all the motions in the universe. Imagination is powerless to conceive of a force capable of disrupting in one mighty outburst all the matter of the universe into fragments against the enormous inward attraction of gravity. Before that upheaval, this agglomeration of matter scarcely deserved the name of universe. But the universe in its present form dates from that event—an event catastrophic of the primitive order but formative of the new. From this theory it follows that all bodies have the same composition and age, though the stars, on account of variation in mass, exhibit great differences in temperature and state. As finiteness, it is now claimed, is impressed upon space by the gravitational influence of matter, the receding galaxies, ever more widely separating from each other, drag space itself with them towards a constantly approached but never attainable infinity. In the course of aeons the mutinous stars must disappear from the vault of heaven, leaving for the depressed remnants of future humanity the outworn planets with the dying sun as the lone visible occupants of space.

The fate of the radiant energy into which the sub-

stance of the stars is transmuted, naturally excites wonder. Apart from the relatively minute amount intercepted by the earth and other planets, it has been suggested that throughout space the reverse process of transformation is reconstituting radiation into atoms, and thence again into stars and solar systems, to be in turn dissipated. These supposed alternating aeonic processes of dissolution and synthesis have been held, in violation of the most assured operation of thermodynamic law, to indicate that the universe has a cyclic nature and is therefore without beginning or end. But an idea that rests upon the fanciful interpretation of a single unproved hypothesis, is too precarious a foundation for so far-reaching a conclusion.

Astronomy has gained impressiveness chiefly by its elevation of the fundamental entities of the material universe, mass, space, and time, from the familiar magnitudes of earth, miles, and months, to the majestic scale of galaxies, light-years, and aeons. No less inspiring is the recent antithetical discovery that the activities of the universe originate in the sub-microscopic world of atoms; of atoms widely diffused in space, or sparsely clustered in misty *nebulae*, or loosely and often densely compacted into stars. While atoms are absorbing energy, their mobile electrons are perhaps forced from stable inner to unstable outer orbits. When the electrons fall back to their original paths, the energy is emitted as radiation. In the fierce heat of the sun's interior, radiation has enormous energy in waves shorter than X-rays. Such radiation, if released, would soon destroy all life upon the earth. But by repeated reflections from atoms, the waves continually acquire greater lengths with diminished energy until when they finally emerge from the solar surface and reach the earth, they form the accustomed beneficent light. When electrons are violently

torn from shattered atoms, they are hurled through space with velocities comparable with that of ether waves, and herald their arrival at the earth, probably as a portion of the mysterious cosmic rays and the tremulous curtains of auroral light.

Three forces of astronomical importance, all obeying the same law, are centred in the atom. Arising from the electrical nature of electrons and protons are the electric forces of attraction and repulsion. Similar magnetic forces originate in the spinning and orbital motions of electrons. From the interaction of atoms with space comes the attractive force of gravitation. Thus the most profound secrets of astronomy as well as physics are now revealed as the attributes of atoms and space.

Though a vast portion of the universe is visible at once, it is impossible, because of the finite velocity of light, to discover its state everywhere at the same moment. For the rays of light simultaneously arriving at the earth from every part of the sky, left their stellar sources from four years ago, in the case of the nearest stars, to one hundred and fifty million years ago, for the most remote. Astronomical observations are therefore always out of date, usually by enormous intervals of time; and it is a misleading assumption to suppose that throughout such immense periods the galaxies and stars have remained unchanged. As light is the sole means of communication in the universe, any hope of ever discovering the simultaneous condition of all its parts must be abandoned.

V

In its long history of nearly five millennia, astronomy, slowly penetrating to the foundations of the universe, has irresistibly advanced from the superficial depiction of

constellations to the profound study of atomic structure and behaviour and the mysterious interactions of matter and space. Three problems of momentous importance, the origin, meaning, and destiny of the universe, are beyond its power. The universe's meaning is doubtless found in its conscious life. But from the nature of the scientific method of investigation, questions of origin and destiny cannot be answered and are therefore subjects only for ingenious and fascinating speculation. To complete the picture of the world, if it may be done at all, recourse must be had to revelation, for precisely where science falters, revelation is assertive; and here revelation, still leaving creative processes a mystery, is as much science as it is theology. "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands. They shall perish; but thou continuest. And they all shall wax old as doth a garment; and as a mantle shalt thou roll them up, as a garment, and they shall be changed."

Much in this trenchant utterance, which sweeps the eventful course of astronomical time, suggests the presumed fate of the expanding universe. But while dissolution is foretold, annihilation seems not intended. The universe may already have had one vast primeval alteration in its structure, to fit it, perhaps, for temporal life. Consistent, in that case, with its history would be a second and still more drastic convulsion designed to elevate it from the temporal to an eternal order, as a suitable framework for eternal life.

Further than this we need not go; what lies beyond is of faith, not of science.

QUINTILIAN'S APPROACH TO LITERATURE

P. L. Carver

I MAKE no apology for assuming that most readers of this journal, apart from classical specialists, have but a slight acquaintance with Quintilian. I was myself shamelessly ignorant of his writings until some three or four years ago, when I thought it necessary to investigate the truth of the statement, repeated from one text-book to another, that he exercised a dominant influence on European education in the sixteenth century. Until that time I had been repelled by three facts which constituted almost the whole of my relevant knowledge: Quintilian was a rhetorician, and we have ceased to study rhetoric; he flourished in the Silver Age, and must on that account be less valuable than Cicero; he expressed himself magnificently in twelve books, and a rhetorician cannot hope to atone for his tiresome profession unless he can contrive to be brief, bright, and brotherly. The penalty of asking too much is to receive nothing; and the sight of the twelve books awakened thoughts of the value of time, the folly of attempting to read everything, and the existence of a class of literature which, as Bacon says, is merely to be tasted.

All this will seem very egotistical, but I feel some confidence that my own experience is not unique. Milton, of whom more will be said later, has done something directly, and much more indirectly, to intensify the kind of prejudice which I have indicated. In one of his minor sonnets he speaks of names "that would have made Quintilian stare and gasp;" and Macaulay, after two hundred years, made Milton's line familiar to the wider public by quoting it in a context which associates

Quintilian with "our academical Pharisees."[1] Even in their original context the words convey the impression of an excitable pedant gesticulating about trifles, and we cannot doubt that that was the effect intended. There is reason to believe that Milton had not read Quintilian,[2] and would have justified his abstention on grounds of principle. It is noticeable that Milton never, in his poetry,[3] speaks of rhetoric except in disparagement. He appears to have taken his opinion of its value from Plato;[4] and it is Plato's contention that rhetoric is a false and pernicious art, always the slave of pleasure and frequently the enemy of truth, tempting the appetite instead of curing the disease, like an ignorant attendant who offers the patient cakes and candies in substitution for the disagreeable medicine prescribed by the doctor.[5] Accordingly it is Milton's evil characters, or those who have fallen from grace, who excel in rhetoric. It is important to remember that Plato thought of rhetoric as a department, or special application, of the art of flattery. Quintilian, rejecting this and several other

[1]See the third paragraph of his *Essay on Milton*. Whether Macaulay had read Quintilian at the time of his writing this essay is open to grave doubt. He certainly did so some fourteen years later, in India, and spoke of Quintilian in his correspondence in terms of high praise; but he gives the impression that he was reading him for the first time.

[2]Some cogent reasons for this belief are given by F. H. Colson in his edition of *Institutiones Oratoriae*, Book I (p. lxxxv). To Colson's list may be added Milton's consistent disparagement of rhetoric, mentioned in the text.

[3]The qualification is probably unnecessary, but I cannot speak with confidence of the whole of the prose works.

[4]See *Comus*, 790-1, and *Paradise Regained*, IV, 4-5. In *Paradise Lost*, IX, 1188, there is, I think, even clearer evidence of Milton's indebtedness to Plato for his conception of rhetoric. In *Gorgias* (480) Plato says that he would be willing to admit the usefulness of the art if it were truly the servant of justice: if, for example, the guilty man used it to prove his own guilt, being the first to accuse himself and his relations, in order that they might be delivered from the greater evil of injustice. Milton, at the end of his account of the mutual recrimination of Adam and Eve, adds the significant words, "but neither self-condemning."

[5]*Gorgias*, 465.

alternatives, defines rhetoric as "the science of speaking well" (*bene dicendi scientia*),[6] and it is with that definition present to his mind that he designs his whole educational system for the training of the perfect orator.[7]

The word *orator* has fallen so far into disrepute that to-day we hardly ever mention it except with ironical intent. Impressed with the discovery that it is possible to be loquacious about nothing—a fact which Quintilian knew and lamented[8]—we make an unreal distinction between the man of words and the man of action, and take the strong, silent man as our ideal of human wisdom. We may search the annals of history, ancient or modern[9] without finding a genuine example of a man of action on the grand scale who either lacked the power to finish his sentences or disdained the effort; but we continue to repeat that silence is golden, that still waters run deep, that

> Words are like leaves, and where they most abound
> Much fruit of sense is seldom to be found.

To-day, as in the days of Solomon, "even a fool when he holdeth his peace is counted wise; and he that shutteth his lips is esteemed a man of understanding."

This faith in the hidden sagacity of the inarticulate or incoherent would not have commended itself to the Romans. The whole theory of Roman education was rooted and grounded in one simple principle: that the gift of language is the most precious gift bestowed upon man, and the one which most clearly differentiates him from the brute creation. Cicero expresses the idea many times, but most concisely in *De Oratore*: "In this one

[6] *I. O.*, II, xv, 38. [7] *Ibid.*, I, Proœm., 9.

[8] See *I. O.*, II, iii, 9 and xx, 3-4.

[9] "I know not from what nonsense world the notion first came, that there is some connection between being sincere and being semi-articulate" (G. K. Chesterton, *Autobiography*, p. 142).

thing most of all we excel the lower animals, that we can converse and express our meaning by speaking." The conclusion follows so naturally that there is no need to elaborate it: "Must not, then, each one of us consider that to be superior to ordinary men in that faculty by which ordinary men are superior to beasts ought to be his chief ambition?"[10] That is what Quintilian means when he says that the purpose of his teaching is to produce an orator.

The modern reader will be inclined to raise an objection. He will say that the noblest of the human faculties, and the first to be considered in educational theory, is not speech but reason. Cicero would have admitted the contention, but without allowing it any practical weight. He would have said that reason and speech, *ratio* and *oratio*, are so closely related as cause and effect, or power and manifestation, that the one without the other has a merely hypothetical existence, like music without voice or instrument. Quintilian, following Cicero, gives much the same answer. The supreme God, he says, "who was in the beginning, the father of all things and the architect of the universe, distinguished men from all other living creatures that are subject to death, by nothing more than this, that he gave them the gift of speech."[11] Immediately afterwards he remarks, with some apparent inconsistency, that "reason was the great gift of the Almighty, who willed that we should share its possessions with the immortal gods. But," he proceeds,

reason by itself would help us but little and would be far less evident in us, had we not the power to express our thoughts in speech; for

[10] *De Oratore*, I, 32-3.

[11] *I. O.*, II, xvi, 12. All quotations from Quintilian are given in the form of Butler's translation in the Loeb edition. I think it unnecessary to quote the original, which may be easily found from the references given. For the purposes of the English reader Butler's translation is generally admitted to be the best.

it is the lack of this power rather than thought and understanding, which they to some extent possess, that is the great defect in other living things. . . . If therefore we have received no fairer gift from heaven than speech, what shall we regard as so worthy of laborious cultivation, or in what should we sooner desire to excel our fellow-men, than that in which mankind excels all other living things?[12]

To the Roman mind that is the end of the matter, and the claims of rhetoric, "the science of speaking well," are now firmly established. The modern reader may still feel some doubt. If it is true that the possession of reason is shared "with the immortal gods" above, as well as, in some degree, with the animals below, it follows from Quintilian's argument that the gods, having reason in perfection, must be the supreme masters of eloquence; but in Latin poetry, though the lesser divinities sometimes dispute among themselves, Jupiter is always imagined as strong and silent. Irrespective of age or nation, it would be transparently absurd to think of the source of all wisdom as arriving at wisdom by the processes of logic.

Whatever contradiction there may be illustrates a fact implicit in the whole argument of the twelve books: that vagueness in the use of words leads to confusion of thought. The word *ratio* in Latin, like *reason* in modern English, needs clear definition. Until the eighteenth century English theologians made a distinction between *intuitive* and *discursive* reason, corresponding to the Greek distinction between νοῦς and διάνοια. Poetic inspiration, prophetic vision, the rare flash of insight or touch of genius, are manifestations of *intuitive* reason; but man, for the most part, is denied this higher power, and must find his way to truth by *discursive* reason alone. Milton makes a messenger from Heaven explain that both forms of

[12] *I. O.*, II, xvi, 14-8.

reason[13] are attributes of the soul, from which it must follow that neither is bestowed upon the lower animals. The fruits of the earth, he says,

> to animal,
> To intellectual, give both life and sense,
> Fancy and understanding; whence the soul
> Reason receives, and reason is her being,
> Discursive or intuitive; discourse
> Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours,
> Differing but in degree, of kind the same.[14]

That is the whole theory in outline; but we know that inspiration bloweth where it listeth, and it is only discursive reason, or discourse, which is subject to training and development. With this limitation of the sense of *ratio*, Quintilian's contention anticipates the whole substance of a passage in which *reason* and *discourse* are used by Hamlet as synonymous terms:

> What is a man
> If his chief good and market of his time
> Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.
> Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
> Looking before and after, gave us not
> That capability and godlike reason
> To fust in us unus'd.[15]

We must, if we are not to sink back to the level of the beasts, exercise the discursive reason; but how are we to exercise it if not by the use of language, its natural instrument? Bacon expresses half the truth when he says that we clarify our ideas "in the communicating and discoursing with another;"[16] he might have added that we can

[13]The equivalence of *intuitive* and *discursive reason* to νοῦς and διάνοια has not been noticed by the editors of Milton, so far as I can discover. It has been noticed by a commentator on Plato. See Whewell, *On the Philosophy of Discovery*, 1860, p. 445, *n.* 7.

[14]*P. L.* v, 484-9. [15]*Hamlet*, iv, 4.

[16]See the essay *On Friendship*.

have no ideas to clarify until we have first formulated them to ourselves in words. It is only the simplest thoughts, the first promptings of sensory impressions, which are independent of language. A primitive savage might—though even that is unlikely—throw stones into the air without devising a word for *stone*; but long before he began to generalize about the nature of force, of matter, of space and time, velocity and impact, he must have acquired a language; and the growth of that language, in the course of ages, will be an infallible index to the intellectual progress of the race. If there still hovers in the mind of genius

> One thought, one grace, one wonder at the last
> Which into words no virtue can digest,

that is because human language can never be equal to the demands of the higher, or *intuitive*, reason. With *discursive* reason it can and must be in harmony.

I am conscious of having, so far, given less prominence to Quintilian than is due to him as the nominal subject of this article. It is in the nature of things that a practical teacher of the first century should propound some problems which seem to us trivial or unreal and pass lightly over others which we think important. My immediate object is not to summarize the argument of the twelve books, but rather to interpret what is of abiding interest.

We have seen that the complete orator must be, in the highest degree, rational and articulate. Each of these characteristics is bound up inseparably with the other and with a third: the orator must be a person of the highest virtue. "To write perfect prose," says Sir Walter Raleigh, "is neither more nor less difficult than to lead a perfect life. . . . The questions that arise in the study of English composition resolve themselves with surprising frequency into questions of character, motive, and con-

duct. Rhetoric passes into Ethic."[17] So it was in the first century, though Quintilian would have preferred to say that rhetoric comprehends ethic without moving from its own position. There is a perceptible rise in the temperature of the discussion when Quintilian is insisting, as he does through many pages, that reason and moral good can never be at enmity. "Nature herself," he says,

> will have proved not a mother, but a stepmother with regard to what we deem her greatest gift to man, the gift that distinguishes us from other living things, if she devised the power of speech to be the accomplice of crime, the foe to innocency, and the enemy of truth. For it had been better for men to be born dumb and devoid of reason than to turn the gifts of providence to their mutual destruction. But this conviction of mine goes further. For I do not merely assert that the ideal orator should be a good man, but I affirm that no man can be an orator unless he is a good man. For it is impossible to regard those men as gifted with intelligence who on being offered the choice between the two paths of virtue and of vice choose the latter, nor can we allow them prudence, when by the unforeseen issue of their own actions they render themselves liable not merely to the heaviest penalties of the laws, but to the inevitable torment of an evil conscience.[18]

The reader will not, I think, grudge the length of this extract, which does justice to Quintilian's power of exposition. I should like to extend it a little further, for the argument leads to an attractive portrait of the perfect orator:

> It is no hack-advocate, no hireling pleader, nor yet. . .a serviceable attorney. . .that I am seeking to form, but rather a man who to extraordinary natural gifts has added a thorough mastery of all the fairest branches of knowledge, a man sent by heaven to be the blessing of mankind, one to whom all history can find no parallel, uniquely perfect in every detail and utterly noble alike in thought and speech. . . . The good man will never be at a loss for honourable words or fail to find matter full of virtue for utterance,

[17] *On Writing and Writers*, p. 14.

[18] *I. O.*, XII, i, 2-3.

since among his virtues practical wisdom will be one. And even though his imagination lacks artifice to lend it charm, its own nature will be ornament enough, for if honour dictate the words, we shall find eloquence there as well. Therefore, let those that are young (or rather let all of us, whatever our age, since it is never too late to resolve to follow what is right) strive with all our efforts to the pursuit of virtue and eloquence; and perchance it may be granted to us to attain the perfection that we seek. For since nature does not forbid the attainment of either, why should not someone succeed in attaining both together? And why should not each of us hope to be that happy man?[19]

If, as Quintilian believes, we can attain that ultimate perfection by means of rhetoric, it follows that no detail of the art can be too minute to be worthy of serious study. The purpose of the *Institutio Oratoria* is to serve as a technical treatise, and it is for that reason that the non-rhetorician finds the greater part of it dull. We do not condemn a text-book of chemistry for being less entertaining than *Robinson Crusoe*, or murmur in scornful tones that there are bigger things in life than atoms and molecules. On his own ground Quintilian is an expert, and we could not reasonably blame him if his technicalities absorbed his whole mind; but an enlightened expert sees every detail of his science in relation to the whole, and the whole in relation to its governing purpose; and Quintilian never, in the intervening books, loses sight of the principles expounded in the first two and the last. Even when the subject leads him to speak at length "of a noun and a verb, and such abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to hear,"[20] his soul is saved by his redeeming sense of a mission.

It is the habit of the modern mind to conduct every argument by an exchange of metaphors, and Quintilian must be allowed his metaphor to justify his predilection

[19] *I. O.*, XII, i, 25-32.

[20] *2 Henry VI*, iv, 7.

for detail. He says that "unless the foundations of oratory are well and truly laid by the teaching of *grammar*,[21] the superstructure will collapse." By the superstructure we are to understand that ideal harmony of eloquence and moral virtue which we are to obtain by the study of rhetoric; and when we remember that rhetoric begins with the laws of logical expression formulated into grammar we realize at the same time the force of Quintilian's metaphor and the connection, apparent to Sir Walter Raleigh, between perfect prose and a perfect life. We often use the same metaphor to-day, but with a different application. We imagine the foundation as consisting of general knowledge, spread over a large number of unrelated subjects, and we insist upon the necessity of a *broad* foundation. Exactly how broad it is to be has never been determined, for we refuse to entertain the thought of a limit. It must, ideally considered, be infinitely broad, and, as infinite breadth will make an infinite demand upon the time available, the conclusion follows that it will be

[21] *I. O.*, I, iv, 5. In this one instance I have made a departure from Butler's translation, which has *literature* where I have substituted *grammar*. The earlier stage of education, controlled by the *grammaticus* (see *I. O.*, I, iv, 2) began with the study of the language on grammatical lines (*recte loquendi scientia*) and proceeded to the exposition of the poets (*enarratio poetarum*), the whole having a general resemblance (except for the greater thoroughness of the instruction, and the greater importance assigned to it) to the elementary course in "language and literature" familiar in the schools of to-day. In English, therefore, it is necessary to translate *grammatice* "grammar" or "literature," and *grammaticus* "teacher of grammar" or "teacher of literature," according to the context; or, where the word is used comprehensively, to employ some such awkward phrase as "grammar in the broadest sense."

The whole sentence supplying the quotation in the text from Butler's version is: "Quo minus sunt ferendi, qui hanc artem ut tenuem atque iuiunam cavillantur, quae nisi oratoris futuri fundamenta fideliter iecit, quidquid superstruxeris, corruet." The phrase *hanc artem* refers to *grammaticen*, which must, in this context, be taken to mean "grammar in the broadest sense." Butler's translation, by limiting the sense to "literature," gives the impression that Quintilian insists upon *enarratio poetarum* to the exclusion of *recte loquendi scientia*, which is very far from the truth.

infinitely thin and infinitely shallow. Quintilian must be accounted wiser, if we approve the wisdom of the man who built his house upon a rock. He would certainly have answered, had this kind of talk been current in his time, that the breadth of the foundation will be determined by the size of the building to be erected, and need not be considered until the plans are ready; what does concern us, he would say, is to see that, whatever its dimensions, the foundation is deep and strong.

What, then, if it is not to constitute a broad foundation, is the place of knowledge in Quintilian's scheme? If we must retain the architectural metaphor, which makes only a momentary appearance, the answer is that knowledge is an essential part of the superstructure. Quintilian has already said, in the second of the long passages above quoted, that "a thorough mastery of all the fairest branches of knowledge" is one of the first qualifications of the perfect orator, and he elaborates the remark through many pages. He would have his orator

> grounded in astrology,
> Enriched with tongues, well seen in minerals,

like Faustus at the beginning of the play; skilled in medicine, proficient in mathematics, accomplished in music and gymnastic, learned in the law. It is not necessary to labour the point—important as it is in itself—that the necessity so recognized is sanctioned by Quintilian's theory, and, in fact, arises out of it. The relation of knowledge to reason is essentially that of reason to speech. Everyone knows that we may, and frequently do, in ordinary life, abuse the power of expression by talking nonsense and abuse the reason by employing it upon trivialities; but, ideally, the function of speech is to formulate the conclusions of reason, and the function of reason is to methodize such fragments of truth as man can

apprehend. The sum of the fragments constitutes knowledge. Speech, in exercising itself, strengthens the reasoning faculty while submitting to its control, and reason discovers new fragments by the guidance of the fragments which it knows. The end of the process is the end of knowledge, and the end of knowledge is knowledge of the truth.

In such a scheme there can be no room for philosophy as an independent study, for everything which goes by that name will be included in the domain of rhetoric. Quintilian argues vigorously in that sense. He admits that the separation which he deplores may have been partly the fault of the rhetoricians, or of certain impostors who abused the title of rhetorician, but he feels it to be unnatural in itself and disastrous in its consequences, and appeals to the evidence of history:

> These two branches of knowledge were, as Cicero has clearly shown, so closely united, not merely in theory but in practice, that the same men were regarded as uniting the qualifications of orator and philosopher.[22] Subsequently this single branch of study split up into its component parts, and thanks to the indolence of its professors was regarded as consisting of several distinct subjects. As soon as speaking became a means of livelihood and the practice of making an evil use of the blessings of eloquence came into vogue, those who had a reputation for eloquence ceased to study moral philosophy, and ethics, thus abandoned by the orators, became the prey of weaker intellects. . . . As things stand, it is occasionally necessary to have recourse to those authors who have, as I said above, usurped the better part of the art of oratory after its desertion by the orators, and to demand back what is ours by right. . . . Let our ideal orator then be such as to have a genuine title to the name of philosopher.[23]

[22] *De Oratore*, III, 15. Cicero says that this natural union continued until the time of Isocrates: a vague statement, as Isocrates lived to be nearly a hundred. Perhaps the important point is that Pericles lived before the separation.

[23] *I. O.*, I, Proœm., 13-8.

He repeats the admonition in the twelfth book, and with greater fervour. He admits that "the knowledge of things human and divine" must, at present, be sought in the works of the philosophers. "But," he adds,

> how much greater and fairer would such subjects appear if those who taught them were also those who could give them most eloquent expression! O that the day may dawn when the perfect orator of our heart's desire shall claim for his own possession that science that has lost the affection of mankind through the arrogance of its claims and the vices of some that have brought disgrace upon its virtues, and shall restore it to its place in the domain of eloquence, as though he had been victorious in a trial for the restoration of stolen goods![24]

Quintilian, then, though preoccupied with reason and speech, fully recognizes the importance of knowledge. The reader may feel that, with that recognition, the difference between the Roman plan of education and our modern systems disappears, or that what remains is of merely academic interest, as we say of things that are petty, useless, and pedantic. Something of substance does remain, and something very vital, but it is not easy to explain it by quoting Quintilian's direct statements, for it depends upon principles which, in the first century, could be silently assumed. The essence of the matter is that Quintilian wishes to possess knowledge, but not to be possessed by it. He would have had no respect for the man who subordinates his reason to the authority of books, and who spends his time in acquiring what he never intends to use or communicate. He would have been mystified or repelled if he could have come upon such titles as "Hours in a Library," "Beside Still Waters," "Random Recollections," "Musings Without Method." A life devoted to letters would have been, to him, the life of a slave. On intellectual as on political fields the Roman

[24] *Ibid.*, XII, ii, 9.

expects to be the conqueror. He does not run after knowledge; he prefers to draw it to himself.

Quintilian does not say this in so many words, but we may detect the rule by its implications. We must be content with two illustrations, one from his theory and the other from his practical directions. The first will be found in the immediate neighbourhood of the passage, already quoted, in which Quintilian speaks of the unnatural division between philosophy and rhetoric, and the evils which have followed the secession of the philosophers:

> This exhortation of mine must not be taken to mean that I wish the orator to be a philosopher, since there is no other way of life that is further removed from the duties of a statesman and the tasks of an orator. For what philosopher has ever been a frequent speaker in the courts or won renown in public assemblies? Nay, what philosopher has ever taken a prominent part in the government of the state, which forms the most frequent theme of their instructions? . . . I desire that he whose character I am seeking to mould, should be a "wise man" in the Roman sense, that is, one who reveals himself as a true statesman, not in the discussions of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life.[25]

That pronouncement is enough to reveal the difference between Quintilian's standpoint and our own. We do not lament, as he does a little later, that philosophy "has retired first to porches and gymnasia, and finally to the gatherings of the schools."[26] Yet, if we allow our minds to travel back to the seventeenth century, the words will seem to have a familiar ring. Milton speaks to the same purpose in *Areopagitica*, when he says that he "cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed." Unconsciously, in his *Tractate on Education*, he summarizes whole chapters of Quintilian in one sentence: "I call therefore a complete and generous education, that which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully,

[25] *I. O.*, XII, ii, 6-8. [26] *Ibid.*, XII, ii, 8.

and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war." That Milton should have thought of Quintilian as a staring and gasping purist is one of the ironies of literary history, for he himself, in *Paradise Regained*, gives an exact verbal portrait of the ideal product of Quintilian's system:

> I see thou know'st what is of use to know,
> What best to say canst say, to do canst do;
> Thy actions to thy words accord; thy words
> To thy large heart give utterance due; thy heart
> Contains of good, wise, just, the perfect shape.[27]

That is the "orator" of Quintilian's imagination, the "happy man" uniting virtue and eloquence, and having "a genuine title to the name of philosopher." It is not necessary to quote his words to prove that this was the vision which Milton himself had constantly before his eyes, and which, according to his convictions, he attempted to realize in his own life.

The second illustration, intended to show Quintilian's method actually in operation, is taken from the first book, which is concerned mainly with the elementary education of younger pupils:

> In lecturing, the teacher of literature[28] must give attention to minor points as well: he will ask his class after analysing a verse to give him the parts of speech and the peculiar features of the feet which it contains: these latter should be so familiar in poetry as to make their presence desired even in the prose of oratory. He will point out what words are barbarous, what improperly used, and what are contrary to the laws of language. . . . Further, in the elementary stages of such instruction it will not be unprofitable to show the different meanings which may be given to each word. With regard to *glossemata*, that is to say words not in common use, the teacher must exercise no ordinary diligence, while still greater care is required in teaching all the tropes which are employed for the adorn-

[27] *P. R.*, III, 7-11.

[28] See note 21, above.

ment more especially of poetry, but of oratory as well, and in making his class acquainted with the two sorts of *schemata* or figures known as *figures of speech* and *figures of thought*.[29]

It is unnecessary to quote further, for the reader who has any pretension to modern ideas will already have exploded with indignation. Is not this that very practice of murdering in order to dissect which we all agree to be a crime against genius? How can we expect to respond to inspiration if we give our whole attention to verbal forms, to rhetorical devices, to grammatical puzzles, and even search out faults and lapses in order to classify them under three heads? The finer breath of genius is not something out of a scent-bottle, made up by a chemist from a formula. We are ready to applaud the words of a minor poet of the Victorian age: "In many instances the moment a poetical passage is 'laid upon the table' for analysis, the soul vanishes. The moving principle, the partner for life, is gone."[30]

The distinction between the soul and the body of poetry is familiar to all of us, including people who have no other sense of immortality. It would be well if it were less familiar, for the habit of drawing analogies from theological doctrines leads us to exalt works of human invention into objects of worship. We say that we are orthodox if we subscribe to the commandments received by Wordsworth at the foot of the mountain; we are sadly heretical if we doubt the verbal inspiration of *Lyrical Ballads*, and blasphemous if we see any fault in the *Ancient Mariner*; we put off our shoes when we approach *Tintern Abbey*, for the place whereon we stand is holy ground; we must not enquire what is meant by particular lines, but must take the poem in the spirit in which it was

[29]*I. O.*, I, viii, 13-6.
[30]R. H. Horne, Preface to the revised edition (1872) of *Orion*.

composed; for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. Does it ever occur to us that the faculty of reverence may, like any other faculty, be misdirected and misapplied? We sometimes think it strange that the Jews of the Old Testament should have been so strongly tempted to prostrate themselves before graven images, as the impulse is not among our own common failings; but, if we take the graven images to be symbolic of human achievement, are we not ourselves a race of idolaters?

This exaggerated or unseasonable humility was not in the Roman character. The Roman venerated nothing except Rome, and he venerated that only because he saw in it a magnified image of himself. Though not personally arrogant, Quintilian is a typical Roman. If there is knowledge to be acquired he is willing to acquire it; if he can improve his powers by practice and discipline he will spare neither time nor trouble in the effort; if there is a technique to be learned he is willing to learn it, and it would not occur to him that he was desecrating works of genius or murdering their soul by making a close study of diction, imagery, rhythm, and metre. It is true that he looks for faults as well as excellences. The presence of faults in Cicero—for whom Quintilian feels an admiration dangerously verging on reverence—is to him a cheering and stimulating fact, for in that fact lies the only faint hope of successful emulation. To contemplate the unsurpassable and unapproachable would be to him not elevating but depressing. This completes the parallel with Milton. In one of those common phrases which we throw about to-day we speak of "rising to the height" of the poet's inspiration. That imagined height must have a limit, somewhere within the bounds of human achievement. Milton proposed to soar above all human achievement, to "the height of this great argument," the only

truly impassable limit. That is the aspiration which Quintilian would have approved.

"Long as the reader has been detained," as Wordsworth would say, I feel impelled to add that at least one man in modern times has taught and practised the habit of verbal analysis in a way indistinguishable from Quintilian's method, but not with fatal consequences to the soul of poetry. James Boyer, who terrorized Christ's Hospital in the late eighteenth century, is best remembered for having had Coleridge and Lamb among his pupils. "A man severe he was, and stern to view," and such men are not popular; but it is to his credit that he taught one lesson from which Coleridge was to derive "inestimable advantage," as he willingly admits:

> I learnt from him, that Poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes, had a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes. In the truly great poets, he would say, there is a reason assignable not only for every word, but for the position of every word; and I well remember that, availing himself of the synonimes to the Homer of Didymus, he made us attempt to show, with regard to each, *why* it would not have answered the same purpose; and *wherein* consisted the peculiar fitness of the word in the original text.
>
> In our own English compositions . . . he showed no mercy to phrase, metaphor, or image, unsupported by a sound sense, or where the same sense might have been conveyed with equal force and dignity in plainer words.[31]

That is what Quintilian would have taught if he had returned to life in the England of the eighteenth century, though Quintilian would have taught it more graciously. Everyone who has studied the Romantic Movement knows what was the effect, in later years, of Coleridge's attention to that lesson.

[31] *Biographia Literaria* (ed. Shawcross), I, pp. 4-5.

THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AN INTERPRETATION

N. F. Langford

THE history of the Protestant churches in America has two phases. The first did not survive a century of American growth. The second has prevailed until our own times, and is now probably nearing its end. The first was a projection of old-world Protestantism. The second was the product, partly of eighteenth-century intellectual trends throughout the Western world, but also of distinctively American elements; and the remarkable longevity of the phase is in large measure owing to the social and economic conditions of a frontier continent.

The barrenness of religious life in America since the eighteenth century can be comprehended only in the light of this historical distinction. The dreary spectacle of American church history has not been generally understood, partly, perhaps, because those who might be in a position to appreciate its dreariness have not been tempted to analyse it. Secular historians, having no religious axe to grind, could at least have been helpful by pointing out necessary distinctions. As it is, denominational historians, who have pretty well monopolized the subject, have failed to distinguish in American history between what is native and what is alien to Reformation theology. Yet without the differentiation between two profoundly dissimilar modes of thought, the characteristics of either early or modern American religion cannot be grasped. To depict merely a process of evolution is sound only on the general historical principle that one thing leads to another. To portray a steady broadening down to a state of religious maturity is a device fit only

for modernist apologists, and not for the conscientious historian or theologian.

The distinction between the two phases can be expressed as the distinction between two concepts of morality. Sixteenth-century Puritans did not talk about moral men; they spoke of godly men. When Calvin expounded the moral law, as contained in the Ten Commandments, the point of his exposition was that men, since the Fall, could not keep this law except in Christ. Man is depraved, incapable of doing good. Therefore the sole means of satisfying God—that is, by keeping His law—is not within his grasp. The resolution of this dilemma is the sacrifice of Christ, which atones for man's inherent sinfulness, and without which all men are damned. The contemplation of these doctrines produced the discipline known as Puritanism, whereby men sought to avoid the aggravation of that evil which was their quality as fallen creatures. An abhorrence of immoral conduct, and an earnest striving after righteousness, would naturally spring from this faith. But the visible Puritanism which catches the eye of historians, philosophers, and other critics, is but an external result of a theological point of view; and pure Calvinism never identified conformity to outward observances with genuine righteousness, which is an attribute of God. The Calvinist hoped, and even strove, to *be* pure before the sight of God; but he did not think of *making himself* acceptable by a reformatory process or by obedience to a simple moral code.

In the nineteenth century, the moral law was regarded as a set of specific rules of conduct, which could and must be obeyed. A man was judged by his quantitative conformity to these rules. The organized religious forces of the country sought increasingly to obtain the formal regulation of public conduct by the standards laid down

by themselves. Specific virtues were recommended, not simply because they were prescribed by the Bible, but also because of their utility in practical life. Finally, emotional piety—itself, perhaps, counted as *one* of the civic and personal virtues—provided the driving force of moralized religion.

In the intervening century—the eighteenth—is the key to this discrepancy in points of view. A survey of the history of American Protestantism will make the distinction clear, and may also reveal the factors which produced the characteristic religious thought of this continent in the modern era.

II

Purity of worship is at the heart of Calvinistic Puritanism, rather than purity of life. The latter was, to be sure, held to be both desirable and necessary. Salvation was certainly not by works; nevertheless, evident godliness could not be spurned as a thing irrelevant to the life of faith without danger to orthodoxy and to the community. And judging by all accounts, a movement for the purification of human conduct was highly appropriate at the time of the genesis of English Puritanism; nor were the Puritans alone in recognizing this fact.[1] Puritans were undoubtedly more sensitive to moral offences than men with less fervent religious interests; and it is not a case for wonder if they contemplated a possible human society where the evils of the times—such as the drunken brawls attendant upon religious festivals—were suppressed. Nevertheless, the Church itself was the focus of controversy. The primary desire of the dissenting groups

[1]For examples, see some notes by A. L. Cross (in the *American Historical Review*, XXI, pp. 312-4) concerning the attempts of local non-Puritan authorities all over England to improve moral conditions during the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods.

was to preserve the purity of Christian institutions—in respect not simply to the specific forms used, but to the general religious health of the Church as a society of believers. The opposition to certain features of the Anglican ritual was not a product of superficial squeamishness, but resulted from a deep suspicion of everything that distracted the individual from the elemental doctrines of Christianity.

The ecclesiastical issue, so far as the New England Puritans were concerned, was not strictly involved with church polity. Modern research has shown the origin of later Congregationalism to be in the Independent Puritanism of Henry Jacob, who was not a separatist in the Brownist or Barrowist sense of the term.[2] A late form of the covenant taken by Jacob's own congregation reads quite simply: "To walke togeather in all the Ways of God so farr as he hath made known to Us, or shall make known to us, & to forsake all false ways, & to this the several Members subscribed their hands."[3] The New England Puritans seem to have belonged to this school of Nonconformity. Certainly, they did not on their arrival in America profess separation from the Church of England. Theirs was rather the Independent ideal of separation from the world: such is the spirit which breathes through all the early Massachusetts writings, and also the priceless record of an even earlier and more single-minded colony—Bradford's *History of Plymouth Plantations*. Their hope was not to set up a particular mode of church government, but to establish a community in which the integrity of their faith, guarded from the perils of alien beliefs and practices, might be preserved.

[2]Champlin Burrage, *The Early English Dissenters in the Light of Recent Research*, Cambridge, 1912, I, chaps. xii-xiv; and Perry Miller, *Orthodoxy in Massachusetts*, Cambridge, Mass., 1933.

[3]Burrage, *op. cit.*, I, p. 321.

And the object was not merely to protect themselves against the evils of the times, such as immorality and persecution, but actually to enjoy the positive pleasures of living among the elect.

The secret of early New England history is in this common implicit desire. Settlement in Massachusetts has usually been described by the misleading term "theocracy." Homogeneity of population and a general agreement on the nature of the Christian religion explain the life of the early settlers better than do any scraps of political theory jotted down in an evil moment by John Cotton.[4] Contrary to general belief, the ministers had no official connection with civil government. Nor did the New England laws of the seventeenth century make any attempt to enforce a peculiar code of morality. The capital offences enumerated in the *Body of Liberties* (1641), although supported by Biblical texts, are ordinary enough in the light of contemporary penal practices—sedition, blasphemy, witchcraft, various classes of murder, *etc.* Moreover, in legal affairs the settlers combined respect for the authority of the Word of God with a very shrewd regard for the traditions of English law.[5]

A taste for sobriety and a horror at carnal and vulgar offences naturally characterized a religious community of this type. Similarly, conformity to the quiet manners of the first citizens would be demanded of newcomers. Once, before Boston was even founded, the Plymouth fathers were impelled to take arms against a sea of

[4]The eminent clergyman John Cotton appears to have been the only early New Englander to employ the term "theocracy" at all—and that only twice. The more famous of these instances may be consulted in G. E. Ellis, *The Puritan Age and Rule in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1629-1685*, Boston, 1888, pp. 175-6.

[5]A careful and convincing study of this subject is by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Introduction to the *Records of the Suffolk County Court, 1671-1680*, Colonial Society of Massachusetts, *Publications*, XXIX.

revellers, and by opposing ended riotous "Merrymount" plantation. But that was an exceptional incident, and justifiable on grounds other than the enforcement of pure Christian morality. It did not take the New Testament to prove the inexpediency of selling guns to the aborigines. On the whole, the moral habits and traditions of the people are only significant as a reflection of a profounder religious temper. In some respects the Puritans were more liberal, both in theory and practice, than later generations. Drunkenness was deplored and punished—a not unusual attitude in any age. But alcoholic liquors were drunk even by elders and pious magistrates; and the godly Winthrop has left us an observation—perhaps the more valuable for being an incidental analogy introduced into a political discourse—which a Methodist prohibitionist could not possibly have uttered: "We doe not forbidd wine to be brought to us, though we knowe it is a great occasion of Temptation to sinne."[6] In other words, Winthrop recognized that an attendant social danger does not constitute an inherent evil.

Throughout the early period of their history the purity of the church seems to have been the prime religious object of the New England Puritans. The spread of Antinomianism was regarded as a blow at the integrity and solidarity of their church. In 1660, in their address to the king, they explained that their end in coming to America had been to enjoy their own manner of worship.[7] Similar was the testimony of the disgruntled Samuel Maverick: "Nor could any competency of Knowledge or inoffensiveness of liveing or conversation usher a man into Church ffelowship, unless he would also acknowledge

[6]From *Arbitrary Government Described* (in R. C. Winthrop, *Life and Letters of John Winthrop*, Boston, 1869, II, p. 452).

[7]Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

the discipline of the Church of England to be erroneous, and to renounce it."[8] The problem in breaking down the exclusiveness of the community was to overcome the insistence on the purity of church discipline. Considerations of moral conduct play only a secondary part in either the civil or the ecclesiastical history of early New England.

III

During the latter part of the seventeenth century the vitality of faith began to wane, and the neglect of the church institutions assumed in contemporary eyes a connection with the decline of public morality. The Half-Way Covenant of 1662, which allowed baptized persons, even if they were not full church members, to have their children baptized, was a measure designed to offset the alarming disintegration of religion. A few years later New England was plunged into a political conflict with the mother-country, which led ultimately to the American Revolution. New England clergymen concerned themselves at once with the new political issues—an adumbration of the influential rôle of the clergy in the Revolutionary era. New England society was meantime hardening into the form of petrified Puritanism which is more widely comprehended than that of an earlier time—the Puritanism which began to cast its shadow both behind and before, at last darkening Hawthorne's eyes as he looked back on a forgotten age of faith.[1] By the end of the

[8] C. K. Bolton, *The Real Founders of New England*, Boston, 1929, p. 130.

[1] Nothing has done the reputation of Puritan New England so much harm as the famous witchcraft episode of 1692. An entirely isolated incident, occurring late in the Puritan period, it has been popularly taken as characteristic of the New England mind from the first. Hawthorne, in *The House of the Seven Gables*, dated the tradition of the Pyncheon family from the witchcraft scare; and who could tell from the book that the dour and sordid aspect of Puritanism here depicted was not representative of earlier generations? For a healthy and scholarly treatment of this subject, see G. L. Kittredge, *Witchcraft in Old and New England*, Cambridge, 1928, chap. xiv.

century it was possible to regard New England not as the expression, which must somehow be preserved, of a spontaneous faith, but as a community requiring objective religious, political, and sociological consideration. Men like the Mathers combined theological orthodoxy with this more sophisticated point of view. Cotton Mather expresses it in his diary:

> I preached a Sermon at the Lecture, in the Audience of the General Assembly, on the Street or *Market-place* of the City of God, being *Pure Gold*; and I bore due Testimonies against the Corruption of the *Market-place*. I fill'd the Sermon with Testimonies for God and Right, and against the Sins of *Dishonesty*, and the Snares of Intemperance; and added my Hopes for a City of God, yett to be seen in America. I thought it might serve the Interests of Piety and Equity, to spread these Testimonies into every Part of the Countrey.[2]

The eighteenth century is the era in which the various colonies became elements in a larger entity—the new America. Up to the present, this study has been concerned with New England alone. This procedure is justified, not because New England in the seventeenth century was representative of any other section of the continent, but because it provided the only important contribution to religious culture in that period. In the broad scheme of American development the other colonies, though they had their religious institutions, played from the first a primarily secular part; and the not insignificant "Holy Experiment" of the Quaker William Penn in Pennsylvania was related to eighteenth-century religious developments. Now it may be said that the course of history in the latter part of the seventeenth century in New England prepared the way for the predominance of the secularism to which in the eighteenth century all the

[2]Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, ser. 7, VIII, p. 19.

colonies contributed a share. At all events, the survey of religious history in the eighteenth century must sweep a broader field than New England. In this period many salient factors became evident—factors which at first sight appear confused and even contradictory, but which on closer inspection are seen to fit into the pattern of eighteenth-century politics and thought. And out of this interplay of new forces emerged a more or less piously held, but none the less definitely rationalized, morality.

IV

The evangelical movements and the rise of liberal theology are the two outstanding features of the religious period now to be considered. They warred with one another and reacted against one another; yet both are equally products of the times and both are factors in producing the ultimate result. Of the two, liberalism was the more spontaneous. It was the natural outcome of New England habits of mind from the latter part of the seventeenth century, stimulated by, and stimulating, the political ferment of the day. Evangelicalism, much more than liberalism, was a determined response to needs, moral and physical, as they were conceived. This statement, which does not detract from the piety of the evangelical leaders, must be considered in the light of the changing attitude towards sociological phenomena.

Prior to the eighteenth century, the Protestant Church had regarded itself as a society of believers and not as an agency for doing good works. Missionary activity among the Indians had, indeed, been urged as a reason for promoting colonial enterprise. But missionary work contemplated no other end than winning souls to Christ:

> A greater expression of piety . . . there cannot be than to make God known where he was never spoken nor thought of, to advance

the scepter of Christ's kingdom. And now, again, to reduce those who at first were created after the image of God, from the manifest worship of devils, to acknowledge and adore the blessed Trinity in unity, to do this is to be happy instruments of effecting those often repeated promises of God, in making all nations blessed by the coming of Christ, and by sending his word to all lands.[1]

Nor were the methods employed much less simple than the object in view. The New England missionaries did of necessity engage in some philological research. But the painstaking effort to utilize every device that might tell on the Indian mind, which characterizes the Jesuit missions, was entirely lacking. The Puritans gave them doctrine, and in its most abstruse forms—as in the case of the missionary who, miraculously enough, translated into some Indian lingo the following proof that "there is but one true God:" "Because singular things of the same kind when they are multiplied, are differenced among themselves by their singular properties; but there cannot be found another God differenced from this by any such like properties."[2]

The growing complexity of social conditions in America —the result of increase in population, diversification of industry, expansion of the frontier, and the enormous influx of negro slaves—created an objective problem which the newer temper was prepared to tackle. It is significant that the colony of Georgia, founded in 1732, was intended to be an asylum for the poor and the oppressed; and that in Georgia both alcoholic liquors and slavery were at first banned. The slavery situation was one of the most urgent which faced men of humanitarian outlook. During the last years of the seventeenth century two Anglican officials—the Rev. James Blair,

[1] "A Petition of W.C., etc.," 1641 (*American Colonial Tracts Monthly*, I, # 12).
[2] Pierson's *Some Helps for the Indians*, 1658.

commissary for Virginia in 1689, and the Rev. Thomas Bray, commissary for Maryland in 1696—had contrived to interest the Bishop of London in American social problems. The following years witnessed a tremendous outburst of humanitarian activity. Numerous schools and societies were founded, largely under Anglican auspices. The excuse for Whitefield's momentous evangelistic tour through all the colonies was the project of an orphanage in Georgia. The work accomplished was not proportionate to the need; but its character and extent would have been inconceivable in the preceding era.[3]

The emphasis of this social work was not only evangelical but educational as well. The object was not simply to convert the native and negro peoples to Christianity; they must also be brought to a happier, more moral, and more intelligent mode of existence. It was, of course, assumed that the latter condition would result from the introduction of the Christian religion. Thus, David Brainerd, a missionary to the Indians, who taught orthodox doctrine, insisted on the efficacy of this doctrine in promoting higher standards of morality and a desire for knowledge among the native races.[4] Samuel Kirkland, another missionary of the latter part of the century, donated some land for an Indian school, including in his deed a prayer that "the institution may grow and flourish, that the advantages of it may be extensive and lasting, and that, under the smiles of the God of wisdom and goodness, it may prove an eminent means of diffusing useful knowledge, enlarging the bounds of human happi-

[3]For an account of Christian work among the negroes, see M. W. Jernegan, *Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America*, Chicago, 1931, chap. ii.

[4]Jonathan Edwards, *Works*, II, pp. 416-9. The edition cited throughout this article is the London edition of 1839.

ness, aiding the reign of virtue, and the kingdom of the blessed Redeemer."[5]

Negro and Indian problems were, of course, but a particular phase of the broad social need. Churchmen became increasingly aware of immorality and the neglect of religion on the frontier, and of the decline of religion throughout even the older parts of the continent—conditions which were especially serious in the Middle Colonies. The Church of England again took cognizance of these evils, and Lewis Morris, a prominent figure of eighteenth-century New York, actually devised a scheme whereby candidates for large benefices in England should be required to serve three years free of charge in America. The Great Awakening, however, was the significant response to the challenge of the times. In some parts of the continent the revival had been brewing for years.[6] Now it would be false to say that the movement was meant to be anything but profoundly evangelical. It is, indeed, the evangelical emotionalism of the Awakening which has most attracted popular attention. Nevertheless, although the leaders were fundamentally religious men and the central emphasis was on conversion, a specific result was looked for from the movement—namely, the heightening of religious and moral life.

Jonathan Edwards himself, whose exaltation of the sovereignty of God might be taken to limit his belief in the human possibilities of the movement, was full of exhortations to seize this opportunity of establishing the latter-day glory in America. Nor could he praise too highly the visible effects of the Awakening. He declared

[5]S. K. Lothrop, *Life of Samuel Kirkland* (*Library of American Biography*, ed. Jared Sparks, ser. 2, XV).

[6]See C. H. Maxson, *The Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies*, Chicago, 1920. Pietistic influences in Pennsylvania and New Jersey were most significant.

that the work was "very glorious" as to (1) its extent, (2) the numbers converted, (3) the circumstances of the revival, such as the sudden awakening of an entire congregation.[7] This is surely a striking adumbration of modern ecclesiastical geography and missionary arithmetic. Edwards also described the respects in which moral improvement had become evident—drunkenness, sabbath-breaking, and the like, dwindled at the touch of the revivalists.[8] The chief things required to ensure the continuance of the work were "zeal and resolution" on the part of the ministers, funds from rich men, and prayer from everybody.[9] The device of openly renewing the covenant with God was specially recommended, as having produced gratifying results in Scotland.[10]

The Great Awakening was part of a broad religious movement which swept Europe, England, and America in the eighteenth century. Many strands of religious belief went into it—Pietistic, Calvinistic, Arminian. But the significant thing is that so cosmopolitan a movement could exist and unite these varying shades of faith. Considered as a great wave of religious effort sweeping in to fill up a consciously-perceived lacuna, it becomes explicable. Edwards wrote a *History of the Work of Redemption*,[11] which he said could be traced and prognosticated from the fall of man to the end of time. As he traced the process, one phrase kept recurring for application to each succeeding period: "the *success* of the redemption." Edwards saw the need and tried to measure the success in his own time.

The liberal movement in theology scarcely needs much treatment here. In the straight theological field it ended in Unitarianism, which, in contrast to Calvinism, affirmed

[7] Edwards, *Works*, I, pp. 379-80. [8] *Ibid.*, I, p. 374.
[9] *Ibid.*, I, p. 424. [10] *Ibid.*, I, p. 429. [11] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 532-619.

the dignity of man, the humanity of Christ, the unity of God, and—in Channing's view—the supremacy of reason. As to morality, it opposed an emotional conception of righteousness, and simply asserted that God is pleased with solid, visible goodness in human conduct. The Universalists, who were organized even earlier than the Unitarians, declared, in 1803, their belief "that holiness and true happiness are inseparably connected, and that believers ought to be careful to maintain order and practise good works; for these are good and profitable unto men."[12] The political issues of the day gave a practical weight to liberal religion, which aligned itself with political liberalism and even drew on the traditions of Congregational church polity for its arguments.[13] Liberalism in New England was, of course, a special phase of the general development, but it obviously falls in line with the various shades of liberal thought, including Deism, which appeared throughout the colonies. Nor was the frontier outside this development. For example, Ethan Allen, the famous "backwoods thinker" and soldier, was a strong protagonist of Free Will, and the author of a book entitled *Oracles of Reason* (1784).

Although in New England the theology of Jonathan Edwards and his followers clashed with the opinions of the liberal thinkers, Edwards was far from being outside the stream of eighteenth-century thought. Edwardian theology was not Calvinistic at all; nor were the direct influences which played upon him limited to the pure Calvinistic school, for Locke and probably Berkeley early affected his point of view. His thinking is considered by admirers to have anticipated many of the ideas of Hume,

[12]Quoted by J. C. Adams, *Religious History of New England*, King's Chapel Lectures, Cambridge, Mass., 1917, p. 308.

[13]For the most thorough treatment of this subject, see Alice M. Baldwin, *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution*, Durham, 1928.

Coleridge, Mill, and Schleiermacher; and William Godwin was directly indebted to the New England evangelist. To Edwards, the intellect was the recipient of revelation. One of his biographers observes: "In comparing the essential quality of revelation to light, Edwards is widely separated from those who have conceived revelation mainly as law addressed to the conscience."[14] Radically unlike Calvin in this, Edwards postulated an immanental, not a transcendent, God, as when he declared that "the beauties of nature are really emanations or shadows of the excellency of the Son of God."[15] He thus provides the bridge between Calvinism and the transcendentalists of nineteenth-century New England. Finally, it is to be noted that Edwards's interest in the concrete mental and moral effects of Christianity is not accidental. It had its theoretical justification in his system: "I cannot see which way we are in danger, or how the devil is like to get any notable advantage against us, if we do but thoroughly do our duty with respect to those two things, *viz.*, the state of persons' *minds*, and their moral *conduct*; seeing to it that they be maintained in an agreeableness to the rules that Christ has given us."[16]

The elements in eighteenth-century religious thought which are not specifically included in these categories of evangelicalism and liberalism, fit equally well into the pattern. There is the New England Samuel Johnson with his Berkeleyan philosophy and his concern for education and self-discipline and virtue. And there is Mather Byles, representative of the body of complacent New England society not prominent in either doctrinal or political controversy, with his love of Pope, his reputation

[14] A. V. G. Allen, *Jonathan Edwards*, Boston, 1890, p. 68.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 355-6.
[16] Edwards, *Works*, I, p. 368.

as a "wit," and his smug eighteenth-century verse, of which one example may be given:

> Lord, guard thy Favours; Lord, extend
> Where farther Western Suns descend;
> Nor Southern Seas thy Blessings Bound:
> 'Till Freedom lift her chearful Head,
> 'Till pure Religion onward spread,
> And beaming wrap the Globe around.[17]

And through the whole scene moves the characteristic figure of Benjamin Franklin, forming friendships with Anglicans and evangelicals alike, promoting education, science, and charity, leaning to Deism (especially in France), commending virtue, and practising the *bourgeois* asceticism which Max Weber confused with Calvinistic morality.

V

The turn of the century witnessed a new revival on the frontier—a concerted effort to offset frontier godlessness, which was the precursor of almost continuous home-missionary activity ever since.[1] In this revival strong emotionalism was combined with what the leaders considered a gratifying improvement in moral conditions. There is no space—or need—to detail the attempts of the churches, now hardened into modern denominations, to evangelize the receding West throughout the nineteenth century. The social problems of the frontier provided the definitive factor in religious history for a hundred years. The problem was obvious and difficult: vice was elemental, social conditions varied and complex. The churches perceived a concrete field for work which might

[17]Quoted by A. W. H. Eaton, *The Famous Mather Byles*, Boston, 1914, p. 110.

[1]For the facts of this interesting revival, see Catherine C. Cleveland, *The Great Revival in the West, 1797-1805*, Chicago, 1916.

produce concrete results, and denominations vied with one another to secure the predominant influence in the frontier communities. One would not expect a subtlety of moral or theological doctrine. Nor does one find any attempt on the part of the religious organizations, evangelical or philanthropic, to disguise the obvious nature of their enterprises. Canada, it may be noted, with a briefer history and infinitely simpler social conditions, offers the purest expression of this nineteenth-century Protestantism.

A simply-conceived morality with a highly practical bearing on life thus became the heart of religion. The Civil War, presenting a moral problem, engaged the activities of the churches, whereby they won the commendation of Lincoln. The Young Men's Christian Association arose and flourished. In its crudest form nineteenth-century Christian morality was expounded in the Sunday-school books of the late Victorian period. Odd that the germ of these was evident in the rationalistic eighteenth century! Scientific literature added its weight to crusades against tobacco and alcohol. The Prohibition Movement—which seems to have had its beginning with late eighteenth-century Methodism—assumed its modern shape, and calling political forces to its aid, won a brief victory in our own times. That was the triumph and the collapse of evangelical morality.

It is almost over now. The "acids of modernity" are at length eating into the concepts which linger on only because of habit and the social peculiarities of what was so recently a frontier land. Some day the whole story of Protestantism in America must be told. Perhaps it will be called "The Decline of Faith." At any rate, such a history would not be merely institutional, as most of the existing histories are, but theological and sociological and

on occasion even political. One work should possibly be mentioned—W. E. Garrison's *The March of Faith*.[2] That book certainly attempts, and with success, a synthesis of social and religious history in America since 1865. But it is itself a modernized expression of the passing phase, as the very title suggests; and the author requires that religion seek "new frontiers of politics and religion." It is possible that religious men should forget the word "frontier," lest they spend their labour to cultivate a field which does not bear. Meantime, students of religious America will do well to examine the eighteenth century, hoping to unravel the complicated strands of thought and circumstance which have defined the fabric of subsequent history. One cherishes the memory of those fertile years. It was the age of virile, fascinating, intellectual and political activity. But it was also the age of the religious blight.[3]

[2]New York, 1933.

[3]Since preparing this article, the writer has found that the theologian Karl Barth has hinted at a somewhat similar interpretation of modern European Protestantism (*God in Action*, English translation, New York, 1936). The distinctively American factor—that is, the frontier—does not, of course, figure in Barth's interpretation; but the same emphasis is laid on eighteenth-century views of morality and piety.

ON THEORY AND PRACTICE

DAVID BIDNEY

ONE of the main characteristics of our modern age is its pride in things practical. There has been a tremendous change in our social and physical environment by the increase of scientific inventions and social upheavals, and this has resulted in a changed outlook upon the world on the part of modern man. The tendency nowadays is to set the highest value upon things practical, upon that which can be of use in gaining wealth and adapting oneself to an ever-changing environment. What is meant by the practical is taken for granted as something self-evident and is never questioned. And therein, I maintain, lies the greatest danger, for the concept of the practical upon analysis turns out to be extremely complex. Even a brief examination reveals the sophistry and superficiality involved in the popular notion of the term. The general point I shall try to establish in this paper is that much of the confusion in modern thought is due to a false separation between the claims of theory and practice; that in the last analysis the practical is relative to the theoretical and that the two spheres are mutually supplementary.

In modern times a theory is regarded as a likely hypothesis invented to describe or explain a group of phenomena. In science particularly, a theory has come to be considered as a suggestion or proposed plan of action, and hence as something which has no validity or truth-claim until tested by its practical effects or consequences. The value of a theory is determined by its ability to lead to fruitful action. Theory is for the sake of action; practice is primary. In order to appreciate our modern attitude towards theory and practice, it will

be best to investigate briefly the development of these concepts in the history of human thought. In what follows I shall present a brief historical analysis of the main philosophies of life from the Greeks to modern times, with special reference to the rôles they assign to theory and practice.

The Greeks, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, clearly distinguished between theoretical and practical activity. Theory meant detached and contemplative vision, and as such was equivalent to what we moderns mean by culture. Practice, on the other hand, involved the active effort or will to realize or embody through some form of motion the ideals of conduct conceived by the intellect. On the principle that "where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each is different,"[1] Aristotle distinguished the theoretical from the practical reason. The former had for its object things eternal and necessary; the latter had for its object things mutable and contingent. The Greeks did not urge that the intellect was to be cultivated to the neglect of the body; they realized that the intellectual pursuits were dependent upon the acquisition of a virtuous character through the formation of rhythmic habits of activity. Their cardinal principle was that proportion and measure, the right mean, determined good and evil conduct. Man was an organic unity and his education must meet the requirements of both the physical and mental aspects of his nature; the life of the soul was to be expressed through the choral dance which included gymnastics for the body and poetry and music for the soul.[2] From the point of view of the individual who was being educated practice, expressed in the formation of habits, was prior to theory; but from the point

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139 a.

[2] See F. H. Anderson's *The Argument of Plato* for a full analysis of this point.

of view of the educator, theory was to determine practice. Plato and Aristotle agreed that the life of reason, contemplative activity, was not an end in itself; the philosopher, as Plato expressed it, must also be king. He must re-descend into the cave of ignorance and enlighten those who have not beheld the sun of truth and reality. Thus practice as manifested through conduct determined theory and theory determined conduct.

Plato and Aristotle also introduced the principle of value. Self-expression was not in itself a good; everything depended on the nature of the self expressed. All the activities of man were not on an equal basis; some were higher or more worthy than others, though all were necessary for a complete life. The perfection of man consisted not only in exercising his powers but in directing those activities towards worthy objects. This immediately raised a variety of problems, such as, what is the nature of the reality towards which human conduct is to be directed? What are the chief functions of the soul and their distinguishing characteristics? Both Plato and Aristotle replied that reality has the permanence of being and is immutable; that which is ever subject to change and flux cannot be said *to be*. They differed, however, as to the precise nature of the principle of being. According to Plato, reality was constituted by a multiplicity of Ideas or forms of being, each absolutely perfect in its kind, dominated by the Idea of the Good. Aristotle maintained that reality consisted of a variety of individual substances each constituted by a union of matter and form which were inseparable, except in the case of God, the most perfect being, who, as pure activity or thought, had no admixture of matter. Both Plato and Aristotle agreed that reason was the highest function of man since by reason he conceived the divine forms of

being and became in a measure immortal. Through the life of reason man was able to transcend himself and identify himself with an unchanging reality. Aristotle pointed out that the life of reason was the highest but that man was capable of it only in his "brief best moments," though such is the life we must attribute to God. In brief, they both concurred that there were degrees of being among actual realities and that there were gradations of value among human activities according to the nature of the objects towards which they were directed. Although they preferred theory to practice, they never separated them so as to exclude any interrelation between them. Man as part of nature was an organic unity; the cultivation of theory determined the practice of the educator, and practice as expressed in character and conduct determined one's theoretical outlook.

The followers of Plato and Aristotle disturbed this harmony between theory and practice. The Neo-Platonists emphasized the mystical aspect of Plato's thought. Since the Ideas as norms of perfection were not derived by abstraction from sense-experience and the noblest life was the life of reason, they held that the wise man was he who withdrew as much as possible from the world and cultivated his intellect. This attitude of mind was encouraged by two influences: first, the destruction of the Greek city state and the uncertainty of the ensuing times; secondly, the attempt to combine Platonism with Christianity.

The general tendency of this period was to regard body and soul as in opposition; the natural appetites of the body, such as the sexual appetite, were to be repressed and man's concern was to be for the salvation of his soul. Happiness was primarily a personal matter, a

state of the spirit, and the important thing for salvation was right belief. This produced an other-worldly attitude; man was encouraged to disparage this world and its pleasures and to retire within himself. The Neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus, regarded the mystical life, the life of ecstatic absorption in the One, as the height of perfection and the desired consummation. The growth of the monastic orders in the middle ages is due primarily to the desire on the part of large numbers of men and women who wished to withdraw from the world, to devote themselves to the salvation of their souls.

All these tendencies or movements have this in common, namely, that they valued theory above practice, a state of private feeling more than action on the environment, belief more than conduct. Whereas the Greeks regarded knowledge or right conviction as the indispensable condition of moral conduct,[3] the Neo-Platonists, on the other hand, considered knowledge and belief as ends in themselves. In the history of religion the influence of this attitude of mind is shown in the fierce religious persecutions of those who differed from the orthodox beliefs of the community.

With the Renaissance and Reformation there was a return to the humanism and naturalism of the Greeks. Interest was revived in the scientific knowledge of nature. Man was encouraged to live the life of the senses and to participate in the affairs of social life. The recognition came about that a full life required the use of all man's powers; that man and nature were objects worthy of interest and study. Hence arose men like Bruno, Galileo, Hobbes, Newton, Descartes, and Spinoza, who began afresh to investigate the nature of man and the physical world. There was a general questioning of authority in

[3]See G. S. Brett's *Psychology Ancient and Modern*, chap. ii, on this point.

religion, science, and politics. Typical of the early seventeenth century was Descartes, who began his philosophical researches by doubting everything. Generally, it may be said, the tendency of the times was empirical; men observed the facts of nature and refused to accept the traditions and dogmas of established authority.

The British philosophers of the eighteenth century, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, developed the epistemological implications of the empirical method. However much they differed in details, the main thought they had in common was that knowledge of reality was given through sense-perception and that the truth of ideas ultimately depended on the immediate evidence of the senses. In other words, they maintained an *a posteriori* doctrine of knowledge in opposition to the *a priori* theories of the Scholastics and Rationalists. This tradition was continued in the nineteenth century by J. S. Mill, who applied it to ethical and social problems. In his doctrine of Utilitarianism he urged that the value or worth of conduct and of social institutions was to be judged by their utility or directly experienced consequences in promoting human happiness—a doctrine which did much to further social legislation in England.

This movement of thought culminated in the famous critiques of Kant, the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. As the titles of his works indicate, Kant made a sharp division between theory and practice. Pure Reason was concerned only with phenomena, with appearances, but gave no knowledge of reality, of things-in-themselves. The Practical Reason gave knowledge of the requirements of moral conduct; it postulated the requirements of an intelligible world and an intelligible life. Kant thus introduced a radical bi-

furcation into human thought, which his successors tried vainly to bridge.

Fichte in his *Vocation of Man* gave the priority to the practical aspect of man's nature. We know reality because we must act; reason and theory involve one in hopeless, paralysing scepticism. In Hegel, however, we have a return to rationalism. According to Hegel, the ultimate reality is the absolute Idea which is all-inclusive. From the Absolute evolve all the phenomena of space and time in rational order, from thesis to antithesis and synthesis. Hegel's fundamental doctrine was that "the real is rational and the rational is real," and hence he attempted to deduce all the metaphysical categories which culminated, so he thought, in the German culture of his day. Hegel's philosophy tended to rationalize the existent state of affairs; its view was retrospective rather than forward-looking. It is against this aspect of Hegel's teaching that Marx later directed his criticism.

In this connection, account must also be taken of some of the philosophical presuppositions of Marxism, which is so vociferous in modern times. Marx regarded his theory as the logical development of Hegel's; it was Hegel's theory turned upside down. Whereas Hegel had conceived the material world as the development or objectification of an Idea, and the historical process as the development of thought, Marx, on the other hand, proposed matter and activity as the ultimate reality and looked upon human history as a struggle for the satisfaction of human needs. Ideals do not determine action; action and the material requirements of life determine theory. The Marxist differs from the Pragmatist in that he is opposed to the notion that the truth of an idea depends on the practical interests which it sustains or satisfies; he believes that truth is something revealed in the

material conditions of his environment. As opposed to the Hegelians, the Marxists maintain that philosophy should not be merely a theoretical interpretation of the universe; philosophy should provide a plan of action having definite revolutionary consequences.

With the rise of the theory of evolution as enunciated by Charles Darwin, the practical was again given the primacy in general thought. Evolution of species was said to occur through the struggle for existence, which required constant adaptation to environment, so that only the fittest survived. The theory of evolution as developed by Darwin and Lamarck differed from that of Hegel in that the Darwinian theory was entirely naturalistic and introduced no transcendent agencies such as Hegel's Absolute Idea which predetermined the course of evolution. The emphasis was put on the practical efforts and spontaneous variations of the individuals who endeavoured to maintain themselves in a changing world.

This doctrine soon showed its influence in philosophy. Bergson in France, Schiller in England, and James and Dewey in America, developed some of the philosophical implications of the new doctrine. All agreed that the search for truth was the result of the practical requirements of man in relation to his environment. The truth of an idea or theory was dependent on its consequences in leading to the desired results; the working or consequences of an idea were relevant to its truth. This attitude, it is obvious, is entirely different from the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions which gave theory a validity independent of practical needs.

One of the most important influences of the theory of evolution in modern thought is to be seen in the work of Nietzsche. Nietzsche regarded the will as fundamental in human nature and pointed out, with all the

force of a new revelation, that it is the will which determines one's morals and values. Philosophical theory is a direct product of the will of individuals or classes to enjoy power in relation to other individuals. In other words, all theory is relative to the requirements of the will, but what is practical is dependent upon the ends or values desired. He recognized that what ultimately distinguishes different cultures is the nature of the ultimate values they entertain and urged "the transvaluation of all traditional standards of value." In his *Genealogy of Morals* and his *Will to Power* he advocated the values which gave the privileged position to the forceful Superman in place of the Hebrew-Christian system which gave a privileged position to the weak and poor. Nietzsche thus introduced the critique of moral values as a distinct branch of study in modern ethical thought.[4]

II

The above survey makes it clear that there has been a constant shifting in the emphasis placed upon theory and practice at different periods of history. On the whole, I believe, that in this, as in so many other matters, we can do no better than to re-capture the vision of the Greeks. They acknowledged once for all the complementary character of theory and practice and did not emphasize one at the expense of the other. The modern age, it seems to me, has gone to extremes in emphasizing the practical almost exclusively and in disparaging the theoretical. We must come to realize that the term "practical" is complex and that it must not be employed as if it has a narrow, fixed meaning. The practical is that which can be done or achieved; but it must be realized that

[4]See W. M. Urban's article in *Contemporary American Philosophy.*

what can be done is, as Kant pointed out, relative to what ought to be done. In other words, the practical is relative to one's theory of values. What is practical for a religious man, is unpractical for an atheist. All the wisdom of the prophets consists simply in the transvaluation of the current practical values of their day.

In order to avoid a sharp division between theory and practice, we must distinguish two separate factors in all theory, namely, the fixed formal principle and the varying material content. As Plato saw, the formal principle remains constant but the material content is always changing. For example, the nature of justice does not change from time to time, but the degree of justice in a particular act varies with time and circumstance. It is because people who pride themselves on their practicality neglect this distinction that so much bigotry and abuse still prevail. They fail to realize that an act which is practical or useful in one set of circumstances may be unpractical and unjust in another set. Thus it is the narrowly practical people, who are always intent on doing something but not on thinking of the significance of their acts, who are in the end among the most unpractical. It is the so-called practical people who corrupt religion and morals by persisting in acts and customs which no longer serve the purpose for which they were intended. And it is the "practical" folk who are concerned only with making a living but not with how they make it, who are responsible for most of our economic evils.

I repeat, theory and practice are always relative to each other and must supplement each other if man is to live a rational life. Theory without practice is vain; practice without theory is blind and evil. The good life requires a happy combination of both. In the last resort, the well-being of man must be the one criterion,

As Spinoza pointed out, a theory which enables a man to be a good citizen cannot be entirely wrong, however erroneous it may appear. Similarly, practice which is harmful in its consequences cannot be good, however rational the theory on which it is based. The neglect of the former principle leads to intolerance and persecution; the neglect of the latter condones abuses. Only when theory and practice are in harmony can we be certain that we have a vision of truth.

My thesis is that theory must be tested by pragmatic consequences, by its ability to satisfy human needs and experience; but I maintain with the Platonist that theory, though suggested by material conditions, is not abstracted from, or entirely dependent upon, these conditions. I believe, following Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Spinoza, that mind or intellect has a creative activity of its own which is not determined by material circumstances. The ends or values which the intellect conceives and the will strives to realize, are not mere abstractions of actual experiences or desires, but have an eternal reality or validity independent of all temporal considerations. The ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, are ultimate values which cannot be explained in terms of something other or lower than themselves. The value of a theory does not consist merely in its being a means to practice; the validity of a conceptual value is inherent in, and pertains intrinsically to, itself. Hence I am opposed to the pragmatic conception of theory which regards truth and value as entirely relative to the satisfaction of desires or interests. And I am also opposed to the Marxist doctrine which makes theory dependent upon economic conditions and a means to revolutionary activity. I believe with Carlyle that theoretical ideals as envisioned by great men often serve to change the social environment. The intellect of man communes

with eternal verities and man by nature is free to strive for, and attain, whatever ideals of life he acknowledges. If Carlyle goes to one extreme in his *Heroes and Hero Worship* when he maintains that "the history of the world is the biography of great men," Marx, I suggest, goes to the opposite extreme in his emphasis upon the determining effect of material conditions, thereby making the great man simply the product of the times. The theories of great men and the conditions of the material and social environment act as mutually complementary, though independent, forces. One cannot, and must not, be reduced to the other.

I believe that the intellect of man may visualize realities and values which transcend his actual environment. There are ideals of absolute perfection and of an absolutely perfect being which are never apparent to actual experience and are not derived from material facts, but which nevertheless determine vitally the conduct of those who behold and acknowledge them. One of the pernicious influences of the theory of evolution has been the tendency to explain all theoretical pursuits as mere means for the satisfaction of primitive instincts and impulses; and the result has been to take all final value and meaning out of life. It is assumed that life is an end in itself and intrinsically intelligible, but this, I urge, is far from true. The fact is that life itself is not worth living unless directed to the knowledge and realization of impersonal values which transcend life; the meaning and value of life must be sought outside of life.[1] The predominance of the theory of evolution in modern thought has had the effect of making thinkers ignore the independent reality and validity of our ideals and of denaturing all values into practical means of survival.

In actual life, theory as the critical interpretation of

[1]See M. R. Cohen's *Reason and Nature* for a lucid discussion of this point.

life and the universe, must guide conduct or practice. Our theories must be based on an empirical analysis and observation of the facts of nature. But this does not imply a "positivistic" attitude towards facts, wherein the mind does not transcend the observed phenomena. The mind of man ever seeks an ultimate metaphysical principle which renders the phenomena perceived intelligible to him. In other words, as Aristotle urged, man seeks the final cause of things and their purpose and destination. It may be useful for certain immediate needs of applied science to ignore such investigations, but as Bergson points out, the philosopher who is not content with the abstractions of science will seek to intuit and apprehend the final intelligible reality. The human intellect throughout the centuries has maintained that there is a most perfect being or absolute mind which is the creator of the things of nature and transcends nature. God is both immanent in the world and transcends the world. Similarly, man is both worldly and other-worldly, and the reality of his ideals and visions is often more important to him than the stubborn facts with which he is confronted. At times the vision of things excellent and divine is so absorbing that he does not wish to take further interest in earthly things; he seeks the mystic's escape from the limitations of space and time—as Schopenhauer advised all to do who would dwell in peace, free from the restless urgings of the will. But, as Plato said, the good man will not seek to escape the sordid realities of life, and will strive to mould "this sorry state of things" according to the mind's vision of truth and beauty. Philosophical contemplation must issue in practice and serve as a guide to human well-being. As scientific investigation and invention increase the means of good living, philosophic insight must be utilized to educate men, so as to create an environment suitable for the good life.

REVIEWS

NEW ENGLAND: THE RECENT PAST

E. K. Brown

The new vitality which the study of American literature and culture has shown in the past twenty years comes from a sense, now widely diffused, that the American past is "useable." In the nineteenth century and in the first years of the twentieth, Americans thought of their past as a wonderful curiosity shop, in which one could find mementoes of such odd customs as spectral evidence and bundling, or as a portrait gallery of heroes and heroines whose features expressed a strength and a purity which in Fourth of July orations could be contrasted with the pettiness and selfishness of the present. The past was glorious but it was gone forever. In recent years, especially since the intensification of national consciousness in the War, American scholarship and criticism have asserted that the past is shaping the present, that the culture of the present cannot be understood if one does not relate it to that of the past, and that the kind of culture which may be expected in the future will depend almost entirely on the culture of the past and a living awareness of it. To a European this would seem a commonplace; but on this continent, apart from French Canada, the idea that the past is the mould of the present and the future is one which does not easily make its way. We prefer to think of "unlimited possibilities," so great that so far we have only "scratched the surface."

That part of the American past which has been most explored in the new historical way is the culmination of New England's culture in the middle of the last century. Appropriately, Mr. Van Wyck Brooks, who has done more to give the new direction than anyone else outside the universities, begins his history of American literature and culture with an account of New England from 1815 to 1865.[1] He has sought to show American intellectual and

[1] *The Flowering of New England, 1815-1865*, by Van Wyck Brooks, E. P. Dutton Co., 1936. The second volume of the history has been announced; it will trace the decline of New England's civilization from 1865 to 1915.

aesthetic life in the time and place of its highest civilization. His book is extraordinarily rich in background. No other study of the American past is so evocative; the reader comes not only to know, but to see and to feel, what Boston, Concord, and Cambridge were like a hundred years ago. Emblematic incidents abound and are developed into vivid pictures: Ticknor in Rome refusing to make a fourth in a hand of whist with three cardinals because he would not play on Sunday; Bakunin lunching with Longfellow and so charmed that he invited himself to dinner; Holmes trudging or riding along the roads of New England and stopping to measure with his tape the girth of all the large trees; Bancroft newly back from Germany and disgracing himself by kissing old Andrews Norton on both cheeks. Whittier's kitchen, Emerson's study, Ticknor's library, Thoreau's hut are set before us not only as physical realities but as symbols of diverse elements in the life of the age. Mr. Brooks makes a sure use of such material.

His conception of the forces in conflict at that time is clear, and at times new. He sees more clearly than other interpreters that long as was the step from Calvinism to Unitarianism, the step from Unitarianism to Transcendentalism was even longer; as a consequence of his insight much detailed work in the intellectual biographies of the men of Concord will have to be reviewed. He sees that the intellectual history of the age can be clarified if one takes Boston, Cambridge, and Concord as three centres of thought and feeling, each of them representing something distinct; Concord he thinks of as engaged in a major war with the other centres, while Boston and Cambridge carried on a guerrilla campaign of their own. These are insights which have helped to form the beautifully clear structure of the book; there are scores of others which come in as *aperçus*.

The figure of Emerson is at the centre of the work. A year seldom passes now without adding a new interpretation of Emerson. Mr. Scudder has had the ingenious idea of presenting him through the three trips he made to England.[2] They are convenient milestones: the first trip, in 1833, was made by an unknown man in quest of fertilizing minds; the second, in 1847-8, was made after Emerson had written and published his important works and was

[2] *The Lonely Wayfaring Man: Emerson and Some Englishmen* by Townsend Scudder, Oxford University Press, 1936.

eager to disseminate his ideas in a country which professed to be interested in them; the third, in 1872, was made by an old man who was travelling abroad mainly to recuperate from shock. Mr. Scudder has made admirable use of unpublished material in divers hands; he has had access to the vast collection of Emerson's letters which Professor R. L. Rusk is preparing to publish; he has made careful investigations to establish the effects which Emerson had upon his English disciples, most of whom are now forgotten. In the hands of a merely dogged literary historian his subject would have been a dull one; but Mr. Scudder adds to his patience and zeal a sure critical sense, and tucked away in this somewhat unlikely place are some of the best pages on Clough's mind and art ever written. The single defect of his book—it is a serious one—is the author's taste for by-ways; in the later pages one begins to wonder whether the subject is Emerson or William Allingham.

Less immediately attractive, somewhat blunt and heavy indeed, Mr. Dillaway's book has the value of a piece of stubbornly original thinking.[3] About ten years ago, after a conventional education (Andover, Yale, and Harvard) he enrolled in Bliss Perry's course on Emerson; and he began to feel that his eyes were opened for the first time. At that time Professor Perry was engaged in the study of Emerson which was to issue in his admirably suggestive book *Emerson To-day*. Doubtless it was the accident of the teacher's enthusiasm which stirred in the student a concern for Emerson's ideas which he might as readily have felt for those of Jefferson or Whitman. It seemed to Mr. Dillaway that Emerson was "the most highly sensitized reflector of Reality of modern times." From that time to this he has read Emerson daily, and has brought his ideas to a severe test: he has formed the habit of asking what light Emerson could throw on the problems which to-day bedevil government, industry, and education in the United States. He has in a high degree the sense of a "useable" past; and he believes that the best way to appraise the New Deal, the League of Nations, the Stock Exchange, and progressive education is to inquire what Emerson would have said of them. It is stimulating to find Emerson brought into juxtaposition with Walter Lippman, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Dwight Morrow, and Will Rogers, who

[3] *Prophet of America: Emerson and the Problems of To-day*, by Newton Dillaway, Little, Brown and Co. (McClelland and Stewart), 1936.

also find places in the gallery of Mr. Dillaway's sages. No less interesting is the attempt—here Professor Perry has to some extent anticipated him—to set Emerson's conception of the nature of the universe, of the relation between mind and matter, of the problem of mystical knowledge, in relation with the suggestions of Eddington and Jeans. One can raise many objections to the book: it neglects Emerson's poetry, in which he presents many of his richest insights; it tries to minimize Emerson's transcendentalism by a line of thought which is arbitrary and entirely unconvincing; and it flies in the face of Emerson's own conviction, sometimes asserted with pride, but more often with helpless regret, that he was a cold and solitary being. The book remains none the less a stimulating tract for the times; and it would please Emerson infinitely more than most of the bookish studies of which he has been the defenceless theme.

Along with these books on Emerson a place may appropriately be found for Mr. Odell Shepard's spirited and charming study of Emerson's friend for fifty years, Bronson Alcott.[4] Like Mr. Brooks and Mr. Dillaway, Mr. Shepard sees as the essential doctrine of the men of Concord—Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Ellery Channing, and Alcott—the need to cultivate and regenerate, at whatever cost, the individual self. Like them he desires to treat his subject not as an exercise in scholarship but as an exploration of a past regarded as continuous with the present. What is wrong with the present, he believes, echoing Mr. Dillaway, is that solutions are sought through organizations and plans to problems which are soluble only by modifications of the self. The deepest wisdom of America—the wisdom of the Concord men—was indifferent to organizations and plans: it drove always at the need for changing the self. The past is "useable;" and the way of Ford and that of the New Dealers stand condemned by the past. The United States, Mr. Shepard adds, is needlessly impoverishing and narrowing the American character by failing to grasp that men like Alcott and Emerson are typical Americans in at least as high a degree as men like Ford and Benjamin Franklin.

It is interesting to compare his estimate of Alcott with that

[4] *Pedlar's Pack: The Life of Bronson Alcott*, by Odell Shepard, Little, Brown and Co. (McClelland and Stewart), 1937.

which he gave of Longfellow a year or so ago.[5] Longfellow represents that Cambridge which Mr. Brooks pictures as hopelessly at odds with Concord. Both Mr. Brooks and Mr. Shepard share the faint sense of discomfort in Longfellow's presence to which Emerson owned: "If Socrates were here we could go and talk with him; but Longfellow we cannot go and talk with; there is a palace and servants, and a row of bottles of different coloured wines, and wine glasses and fine coats." There seems to Mr. Shepard to be a grave deviation from the central American tradition in the temper of Longfellow's mind, in his mode of living, and in the nature of the interest he took in America. Yet he would not cast Longfellow out of the American tradition altogether: Longfellow's America did exist, and from it in some measure the America of to-day has developed; his America must be known, as Emerson's and Alcott's must be known, but Mr. Shepard would have us discern clearly which of the two was the more valuable.

Although Mr. Harry Hayden Clark's collection of American poetry is not regional in scope, it may be grouped with books which relate solely to New England since of his ten major poets no less than seven are New Englanders.[6] His book is one of those rare texts which serve scholarship as well as teaching. In his selections and even more markedly in his notes, which are abundant, suggestive, and packed with brief quotations from articles in the learned journals and from works now out of print, he aims to give a connected history of American poetry and to relate it closely to the intellectual and social movements from which so much of it has derived. To take but one example, his notes on Whittier, which occupy fourteen double-columned pages, afford the best account of that poet, and of his relation to his age, now available. At times Mr. Clark's enthusiasm has driven him on to critical judgments which are open to objection. It is difficult to imagine that Arnold

[5] *Henry Wadsworth Longfellow: Representative Selections with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes*, by Odell Shepard, American Book Co., 1934. This volume belongs to the American Writers Series, in which appear also admirable anthologies of Thoreau, Hawthorne, Bryant, and Emerson, to name only New England writers. In these volumes for the first time American writers have been edited for college and university use in an entirely satisfactory manner.

[6] *Major American Poets*, selected and edited, with chronologies, bibliographies, and notes, by Harry Hayden Clark, American Book Co., 1936.

would have supported his claim that in these lines from "Snow-Bound:"

> . . . Where cool and long the shadows grow
> I walk to meet the night that soon
> Shall shape and shadow overflow . . .

the grand style is present. They may have the elevation of substance which is one of the constituents of the grand style; they have not its elevation of manner. No less vulnerable is his claim that in this stanza of Longfellow:

> But when winter rains begin,
> He sits and smokes by the blazing brands,
> And old seafaring men come in,
> Goat-bearded, gray, and with double chin,
> And rings upon their hands.—

there is a power of imagery which places it with the subtle, brilliant, imaginative work of Amy Lowell. Such cavils are trifling. The book supplies the essential elements for a history of American poetry since Freneau, and has that awareness of the past as a continuing force, an inescapable tradition, which makes all the books mentioned here so much more vital, so much more profound than the books written about New England in the graceful manner which prevailed before the War.

THE CLASSIFYING MIND*

G. S. Brett

The titles of the two books which we propose to describe seem designed to tantalize the observant reader. They go so far collectively as to agree upon the writer's surname and to admit that he is also called Rupert, but they might just as well inform the public that the author is Rupert Clendon Lodge, that he has been for many years Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manitoba, and is already known for his translation of Varisco's *The Great Problems*, not to mention some independent writings on philosophical subjects. It is a pleasure, not too commonly experienced, to read

**The Questioning Mind: A Survey of Philosophical Tendencies*, by Rupert C. Lodge, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1937.

Philosophy of Education, by Rupert C. Lodge, Harper and Brothers, 1937.

a work on philosophy by a Canadian writer. On this occasion we have two produced almost at the same time by the same person, which must obviously give twice as much pleasure. The reason for this double output is that the author has two distinct parts to play and two different aims. In *The Questioning Mind* he wishes to provide a general survey of philosophical topics for all who are interested in such matters and want to learn what different schools of thought are occupying the field at the present time. As the title shows, the other book is intended for those whose main interest is in education.

In both books the same general plan is adopted. On the whole it is true to say that a philosopher is either an idealist or a realist or a pragmatist. This classification is made the framework of the method used in both books. Anyone who reads them consecutively will be conscious of the fact that the same fundamental ideas appear in both: differences of treatment are due to different applications of the principles. There are very few tasks more difficult than constructing a satisfactory introduction to philosophy; probably the only real introduction is the study of one or more of the great masters. But there is a place for books which provide a grammar of the subject and explain the topics with which all systems are concerned. Professor Lodge has made a very commendable effort to avoid bias and to give the essential elements of the subject impartially. His own preference is for a form of idealism, and, to judge by the number of quotations, he finds most satisfaction in the idealism represented by Bosanquet. This preference does not obtrude itself and will be detected only by the trained reader. The subjects discussed in *The Questioning Mind* are knowledge, the good life, mind, self, and education. Under the heading "knowledge" come sensation, memory, inference, and intuition: in other words, the psychological and logical aspects of the subject are here presented. The good life is obviously equivalent to the subject-matter of ethics or moral values; mind and self are two large topics which commonly occupy a conspicuous place in text-books of metaphysics. These comments show that in spite of the absence of traditional headings (logic, ethics, metaphysics) the author actually presents in outline the field of philosophical thought. Historical references are not wholly avoided: great names appear occasionally as sign-posts. But the method is not historical and no attempt is made to include descriptions of more specialized

types, such as Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, or the modern schools from Locke to Hegel. Because philosophy is partly "mental and moral science" and partly the work of individuals who are constructive artists, every teacher encounters the difficulty of deciding whether it is better to base his method on the historical sequence of systems or expound what are accepted as the inevitable topics and common principles of philosophy in general. The latter method is used by Professor Lodge. Consequently, his book gives the impression of being concerned chiefly with philosophy as it is to-day, though philosophical topics are so far perennial that the old and the new are more distinct in language than in meaning.

Turning to the second book we naturally ask, what is a philosophy of education? To a certain extent the modern mind has turned away from the philosophy to the science of education. This is in harmony with the general tendency to think first of operations and technique, with emphasis on specified tasks. But from the earliest times education has been controlled by some conception of life and therefore by some philosophy, however dimly conceived. This fact is attested by all forms of educational activity, from the early idea of tribal conformity, through Plato, Rousseau, and many others, to the latest schemes adopted in Russia or Germany. The modern theorists would prefer to say that in each nation the education reflects a special ideology. A comprehensive philosophy of education might, therefore, include such topics as the relation of nationalism or collectivism or democratism to educational aims. Professor Lodge has not taken this line of attack. He is really concerned with the application to education of his three types of philosophy, realism, idealism, pragmatism. He uses these philosophical categories to distinguish different attitudes toward the subject, which is divided under the heads, nature of education, the self, mind, knowledge. Subsequent chapters deal with subject-matter, interest and effort, imitation, method, examinations, ignorance, and liberal education, all discussed with continuous reference to the three basic types of philosophy. That these three attitudes are significant in any discussion of education is indisputable. It is perhaps unfortunate that the term "realism" has a meaning in histories of education different from that which it now has in philosophy; as our author says, "Comenius varies enormously from realism in its modern forms" (p. 37). The extreme points of divergence in educational theory might be indicated by saying that

some lay emphasis on "conditioning" as a more or less completely mechanical control of development, while others put the stress on spontaneous activity and creative thinking. The subject is further complicated by the variety of psychological views which are brought to bear on education and have some alliance with the corresponding philosophical attitudes. The contributions of experimental psychology to education are numerous and important: reference is made to these when they are relevant to the topic discussed, as, for example, in the section on memory. But Professor Lodge is more concerned with trends of thought and their influence on the aims or ideals of teachers. The realist believes in strict attention to facts, generally assumed to be demonstrable and independent of the observer; the idealist thinks first of self-development and has much to say about the unity of the mind and the value of constructive synthesis; the pragmatist exalts the concept of action, emphasizes function, and sees education as a process of intelligent adaptation to a social environment. Probably no single writer comes exactly under any of these heads: even the most strict supporters of any one theory make concessions to other views; but in general these differences can be discovered and they are influential. Professor Lodge shows much skill in describing the kind of man who embodies the characteristic qualities in each case. It takes a philosopher to classify men according to the different "isms," but we can all recognize the types of humanity as they appear in daily life. The man who wants facts and usually respects nothing but the rather refined "facts" of science; the idealist who suspects that facts are dependent on interests and in any case are significant only as they are known or interpreted; the pragmatist who likes to view things "in the making" and is interested chiefly in the "life of to-morrow:" these we all know and label for ourselves according to our command of language. If the world of the educationist is very much a world of personalities, teaching or being taught, the variety is not so great as appears at first. There are a few definite types to which the persons conform more or less exactly.

William James produced the well-known statement that philosophy is a peculiarly obstinate way of thinking. No one who is not obstinate in his thinking or willing to make the necessary effort can hope to derive any advantage from this study. But Professor Lodge can write clearly and his language is as simple as the technical

character of the subject permits. Both these books are useful additions to the literature of philosophy. As an introduction to general philosophy *The Questioning Mind* has distinctive merits and should be welcome both in the classroom and in the library of the general reader. The *Philosophy of Education* also provides a much needed supplement to the present stock of books in that field, and should enable the reader to grasp the principles which are more or less openly adopted by writers like Russell and Dewey, and by many practical educationists not so popularly known but none the less important in the criticism and construction of the present schemes of education.

PROBLEMS OF EARLY HEBREW CIVILIZATION*

G. B. King

The "publisher's blurb" is not always borne out by a reading of the book. In the case of Dr. Meek's volume, however, it happens to be so. The cover page describes the book as "a fascinating account of the origins of the Hebrew race," and I have indeed found the volume fascinating.

The book contains the Haskell Lectures which the author delivered at Oberlin College in 1933-4. In developing his theme, Dr. Meek deals with the origins of the Hebrew people, of Hebrew law, of the Hebrew God, of the Hebrew priesthood, of Hebrew prophecy, and of Hebrew monotheism. The material of each chapter, even where the problem dealt with is an intricate one, is clearly, logically, and interestingly presented. Full references are offered for the reader who wishes to know the sources of the author's information or conclusions. Numerous translations of ancient documents light up the pages. Almost every chapter contains a summary of the conclusions, a very great help to the reader who has been following the argument. Altogether, the author is to be congratulated on producing a book of interest and value both to the general reader and to the specialist.

In his first chapter, on the origin of the Hebrew people, Dr.

**Hebrew Origins* (The Haskell Lectures for 1933-34, The Graduate School of Theology, Oberlin College), by Theophile James Meek, Harper and Bros. (The Musson Book Co.), 1936.

Meek starts with the great push of the Hurrians, early in the second millennium B.C., which, starting from the Caucasian highlands, carried them over the whole of the Near East. The Hurrians never founded an empire, but are referred to in the Old Testament under the name Horite and have left trace of themselves in the patriarchal narratives in such references as Genesis 31: 15b, where Hurrian parallels furnish a reading, "For he sold us, and has enjoyed the usufruct of our dowry as well." Following the Hurrians, there came, about 1750 B.C., the Hyksos, a horde of heterogeneous people—for the author maintains that the name "Hyksos" is "not ethnic, as Hurrian is, but merely descriptive"—who went as far as Egypt. Amid this welter of races the Hebrew people were born and are to be recognized in the *Habiru-'Apiru*. Their conquest of Canaan occurred in two quite distinct incursions, that of the northern tribes under Joshua, from 1400 B.C. to about 1300, and that of the southern tribes under Moses, around 1200 B.C. These latter alone had been in Egypt and Kadesh, and they made their way directly into Canaan from the south, only the tribe of Reuben migrating northward around Edom, to the north-east of the Dead Sea.

In chapter two, "The Origin of Hebrew Law," the relations of the Hebrew Code to the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, to the Hittite, and to the Assyrian, are discussed in turn. Marked likenesses are found between the Hebrew and Babylonian Codes, but Dr. Meek contends that these came about through the common heritage of primitive Bedouin law shared by both peoples. He concludes that most of the Hebrew law was their own, the product of the nomadic wanderings of the Hebrews and of their settlement in Canaan. What they borrowed, they adapted to their needs and improved.

Dr. Meek suggests, in chapter three, "The Origin of the Hebrew God," that by reading between the lines of the Old Testament we may gather the ancient Hebrew idea of deity. An exceedingly early form of the Hebrew religion was naturism, as also ancestor worship, with a highly elaborate cult of the dead. Some of these primitive elements remained in the popular religion long after a higher form of thought about God had developed. When it comes to the question of Yahweh and the Hebrews, Professor Meek combats most successfully the hypothesis that made Yahweh originally the tribal god of the Kenites. It is Dr. Meek's view

that he was originally a storm god. Eventually adopted by a particular tribe—Judah is the only tribe that fits the conditions of the extension of Yahwism—as their tribal god, he became nomadic with them, and was then localized, for a time at Kadesh, and afterwards in Palestine. Before this, the other tribes making up the southern confederacy had adopted Yahweh also. At the time of David, he became the god of the united state, having, before the union, only scattered followers in the north.

In "The Origin of the Hebrew Priesthood," chapter four, Dr. Meek concludes that the Levites, following an unsuccessful bid for political power in the south, saved their entity by championing the cause of Judah and becoming the priests of Yahweh, in like fashion as the Druids and the Magi of Persia. When, under David, Yahwism became the official religion of the united state, the Levites became its supreme priestly authorities. Incidentally, Dr. Meek makes a very strong case for holding that the bull-worship of the northern kingdom was native to Israel, being originally the cult of Joseph, or Ephraim.

The author's treatment of "The Origin of Hebrew Prophecy," chapter five, does not depart too widely from established lines. Priests and prophets had a common origin. The priestly office became professional, however, and the prophet arose in protest, meeting, outside the priestly profession, the need for the direct appeal to deity. The prophetic experience was of an ecstatic-mystical type, though most of the prophets had keen, as well as sensitive, souls. The Philistine menace produced the prophet of the preacher type. Prophecy in turn became professionalized, and a new order of prophet arose, with the prophet individualistic and speaking as the inspiration of the moment compelled. These latter prophets "were religious geniuses" who "rose above their time to become the challengers of a new world order."

The final chapter, on "The Origin of Hebrew Monotheism," tells how the Babylonians advanced to what might be termed monotheism by syncretism. The same phenomenon occurred in Egypt, except that in Ikhnaton we have apparently the first real monotheist in history. Neither Moses nor David nor any other early Hebrew was a strict monotheist. Monotheism by syncretism took place gradually in the Hebrew kingdom, but the prophets were not satisfied with this, and, from the theoretical monotheism of the First Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the Second Isaiah, advanced to

thoroughgoing monotheism. "This was monotheism of a kind that none among the neighboring nations ever attained, with the possible exception of Ikhnaton of Egypt."

It is too much to hope that Dr. Meek will win the consent of scholars to all his conclusions. Various theories, for example, hold the field as to the Egyptian sojourn and the conquest of Canaan, and Dr. Meek's view that the conquest took place in two divisions, at widely separated times, and that only one of the southern tribes, and possibly not the whole of that, was involved in the sojourn, will be rejected, in whole or in part, by some critics. Every solution of this most intricate problem sets aside some of the evidence either of outside sources or of the biblical tradition. It may be a legitimate query whether, the two sources of information being so divergent, all that the student of Hebrew history can hope to do is to show the possibilities offered by the external material and point out where the biblical tradition appears to sustain it. This is, however, merely a suggestion with reference to method. Dr. Meek emphasizes the importance of the extra-biblical material, while at the same time he endeavours to get behind the biblical material to the underlying facts; and in the weighing of evidence and the balancing of probabilities which lie behind it, the view he arrives at goes far to meet the difficulties of a vexed problem.

It is probable that Dr. Meek will find it difficult to carry scholars with him in his account of the origin and development of Yahwism. He makes a very strong case for his particular view, a view which resolves much of the complexity of the problem. The evidence of the so-called Song of Deborah will be urged against his contention that the worship of Yahweh did not become common in North Israel until the time of David. Dr. Meek states that the poem "is universally regarded as the oldest writing in the Old Testament" (p. 93), and that it "is generally regarded as having been written by an eyewitness of the events that he records, and the poet was unquestionably a devotee of Yahweh" (p. 153). He would have the poet "commend" in his poem this all-powerful god to the Israelites, who in a storm had ensured victory for the Israelites over the Canaanites. But the poem appears to be more than the production of a Yahweh devotee who would win over Israel to the god in whose power he so devoutly believed. It makes Israel clearly the people of Yahweh. Their victories are his victories and their enemies his enemies. It would seem to the reviewer either

that the poem must be set aside as later in date and so its evidence as to the early worship of Yahweh in North Israel be disregarded, or that Dr. Meek must offer a more satisfactory reconciliation of its testimony with his theory. This is not beyond his powers.

No criticism on particular points, however, can take anything away from the value of this most scholarly piece of work. It is as valuable for the questions it raises as for the solutions it offers. It ranges over all the recent developments in scholarship which bear in the least on the history and religion of the Hebrews. It attempts to supply answers to almost every moot question of that early history. The result is a book which can be ignored by no one who would keep abreast of the material with which it deals.

THE PASTORAL EPISTLES*

E. F. Scott

It is one of the drawbacks of our university system that men of distinguished gifts are sometimes withdrawn from scholarship, and are immersed for the most active part of their lives in administrative work. By a happy accident Sir Robert Falconer has been able to resume his earlier studies, and has now given us a book which makes us realize what he might have done if he had not been diverted into other fields. In one respect his experience as President has been of the highest value to him in his present task. The Pastoral Epistles, above all New Testament writings, are concerned with problems of oversight and organization, and no one is fully competent to write on them who has not himself grappled with such problems. We can feel throughout this book that it is the work of a practical statesman as well as of a scholar.

The book consists of a full Introduction, a new translation, and a commentary on the more difficult passages. We could have wished that these expository notes had been more extended. Some of the most valuable of them will be appreciated only by experts, who know what a jungle of perplexities the author is hewing away in a few incisive lines. In the Introduction, however, he discusses at much greater length some of the cardinal terms and ideas of the Epistles. More particularly he examines, more fully than has ever been done before, the meaning of *Eusebeia* ("godliness") which

**The Pastoral Epistles*, by Sir Robert Falconer [President Emeritus of the University of Toronto], Oxford University Press, 1937.

may be regarded as the key-word of all these Epistles. For the sake of this discussion alone the book will be indispensable to all future students. Hardly less important is the examination of the references to heretical teaching. The section devoted to the "genealogies" is a little masterpiece of philological and historical research.

On the vexed question of the authorship of the Epistles Sir Robert Falconer holds a mediating position. He believes that they are essentially Pauline, and that Paul was the actual writer of the second part of 2 Timothy. In face, however, of the linguistic peculiarities (which he subjects to an acute and detailed analysis), he is compelled to admit that some disciple has, for the most part, edited and elaborated the material supplied by Paul. He holds, on grounds that are not altogether clear, that Titus is the earliest of the three Epistles, and that 1 Timothy is the latest, combining a little manual of church order with the directions laid down by Paul. Many will feel, with the present writer, that the case for even a modified Pauline authorship has not been sufficiently made out. Sir Robert Falconer himself admits that the Epistles can be Pauline only if we assume a second imprisonment, and for such an assumption there is very doubtful ground. Paul's movements in the shadowy interval between two imprisonments are re-constructed, with wonderful ingenuity, from the data of the Epistles; but the suggested scheme breaks down under scrutiny. Sir Robert Falconer has been much more anxious for his author's consistency than the author has been himself.

The question of authorship, however, is a minor one, and far too much attention has been bestowed on it in most studies of the Pastorals. In the quarrel over their authorship the Epistles themselves, with their first-rate value for Christian history in its most critical period, have been almost forgotten. It is the merit of the present book that it concentrates on the really vital questions. We may differ from Sir Robert Falconer in many of his conclusions, but we have to recognize that he has grasped the problems and thoroughly examined them. On every page of it the book is marked by the patience and honesty of the true scholar. While he has theories of his own which he would like us to share with him, the author is much more concerned to state the facts as he has observed them. He goes out of his way repeatedly to supply the evidence on which we may build some other theory than his own.